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John H. Langbein t
The comprehensive federal scheme for regulating pension and
other employee benefit plans, ERISA, 1 is approaching its fifteenth
anniversary. ERISA has attracted a large administrative gloss and
a burgeoning case law. Experience has begun to show the effects of
the statute.
Parts of ERISA appear to have worked smoothly. The report-
ing and disclosure provisions2 that were a central goal of the legis-
lation have been implemented without much ruckus. Another ma-
jor goal of the statute, the vesting scheme that restricts the
forfeiture of pension benefits, has also proved easy to institute.'
The disclosure and vesting rules have produced scant litigation.
Other parts of ERISA have become much more problematic.
The overbroad preemption provision4 has wreaked aimless inter-
ference upon state regulation of areas such as health insurance
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I Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub L No 93-406, 88 Stat 829
(1974), codified as amended primarily in 29 USCS §§ 1001 et seq (1982 & Supp 1988).
2 ERISA §§ 101(a) et seq, 29 USCS §§ 1021(a) et seq.
3 Id §§ 203(a) et seq, 29 USCS §§ 1053 et seq (Supp 1988); Internal Revenue Code
(IRC) § 411, 26 USCS § 411 (1982 & Supp 1988). The Tax Reform Act of 1986, amending
ERISA, shortened the vesting periods. It would be a mistake to conclude, however, that
forfeitures were widespread prior to ERISA. See Richard A. Ippolito, A Study of the Regu-
latory Effect of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 31 J L & Econ 85, 87-98
(1988).
4 ERISA § 514, 29 USCS § 1144.
1105
1106 The University of Chicago Law Review [55:1105
that are quite peripheral to pension policy. Neither a substantial
string of Supreme Court cases nor occasional Congressional repair
has been able to cure the mess.5 Another well known instance of
statutory shortsightedness is ERISA's effort to regulate the finan-
cial affairs of multiemployer plans. The 1974 legislation insisted on
covering these plans without working out the principles, which
Congress had to supply by amendment in 1980.6 The 1980 amend-
ment imposed unexpected and dismaying retroactive liabilities on
employers.7 Although the Supreme Court has mostly sustained the
constitutionality of the scheme, 8 employer resistance to participa-
tion in multiemployer plans has increased, and there is reason to
think that the legislation may ultimately be seen to have doomed
the multiemployer system. Yet another instance of serious disorder
in ERISA is the insurance system that protects workers' pension
benefits in the event that a plan defaults.9 Because the program
rewards moral hazard,10 the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(the federal insurer whose duty is to suffer the consequences) has
amassed a deficit that is growing by billions" and that makes the
' See the most recent case, Mackey v Lanier Collections Agency & Service, 108 S Ct
2182 (1988), which canvasses the prior case law. For a convenient account of the two legisla-
tive amendments to ERISA's preemption provision, see Leon E. Irish and Harrison J. Co-
hen, ERISA Preemption: Judicial Flexibility and Statutory Rigidity, 19 U Mich J L Ref
109, 148-56 (1985).
8 Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub L No 96-364, 94 Stat
1208, codified at numerous places throughout 29 USCS §§ 1001 et seq.
See generally Frank Cummings and Alicia M. Kershaw, Withdrawal Liability Under
the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, 40 New York University Insti-
tute on Federal Taxation § 12.01 at 12-1 (1982 ERISA Supp).
' Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 US 211 (1986); Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corp. v. Gray, 467 US 717 (1984). The specific retroactive liability upheld as con-
stitutional in Gray was subsequently eliminated by Congress in the Tax Reform Act of 1984,
Pub L No 98-369, § 558, 98 Stat 494, 899, (1984), codified at 29 USCS § 1381 and 26 USCS
§ 401 (Supp 1988). See, LA.M. Nat. Pension Fund v Allied Corp., 596 F Supp 481, 482 (D
DC 1984), noting that "[t]he effect of the 1984 Act is to moot the decision in Gray." Other
retroactive parts of the 1980 amendments were not affected by the Tay Reform Act.
The Third Circuit held a piece of the 1980 Act unconstitutional in United Retail &
Wholesale Employees v Yahn & McDonnell, Inc., 787 F2d 128 (3d Cir 1986). The Supreme
Court affirmed the result without opinion on a 4-4 vote, sub nom Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corp. v. Yahn & McDonnell, Inc., 107 S Ct 2171 (1987).
1 ERISA's Title IV, § 4001 et seq, 29 USCS § 1301 et seq.
10 Mainly, because ERISA's funding rules allow new liabilities to be created and amor-
tized over a thirty year period, § 302(b)(2)(B)(iii), 29 USCS § 1082 (b)(2)(B)(iii), while the
Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation ('PBGC') becomes liable for these promised benefits
over five years (subject to certain restrictions and ceilings). ERISA § 4022 (b)(1), 29 USCS §
1322 (b)(1).
" In November 1986 the executive director of the PBGC estimated this deficit at be-
tween $2.3 and $2.4 billion and predicted that it would exceed $4 billion by the end of 1987.
EBRI (Employee Benefit Research Institute), PBGC's $4 Billion Deficit, 7 Employee Bene-
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program inherently unstable.
ERISA fiduciary law has not been widely reckoned to be on
the list of ERISA's major blunders. In the present article we show
that it belongs there. We observe that the central concept of
ERISA fiduciary law, the exclusive benefit rule, misdescribes the
reality of the modern pension and employee benefit trust. We show
that the contradictions of the exclusive benefit rule bedevil a re-
markable array of the main issues in modern pension trust admin-
istration: takeover cases, social investing, employee stock owner-
ship schemes, asset reversions from terminated plans, and judicial
review of benefit denials and other plan decisions. We emphasize
that the mess in ERISA fiduciary law cannot be ameliorated until
courts and other decision makers recognize the multiplicity of in-
terests that inhere in the modern pension and employee benefit
trust. We point to the familiar trust law concept of the duty of
impartiality as a likely doctrinal rubric for taking account of this
multiplicity of interests.
Section I of the article discusses the trust law antecedents of
fiduciary duties under ERISA. Section II briefly describes the ty-
pology of pension and employee benefit plans. Section III examines
the underlying tensions between trust law and fiduciary duty law.
The remainder of the article examines a number of issues that
have arisen as a result of these tensions.
I. THE TRUST LAW ANTECEDENTS OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES UNDER
ERISA
The main fiduciary provisions of ERISA have remained unal-
tered since Congress enacted the statute in 1974. Section 403 im-
poses a rule of mandatory trusteeship. Apart from plan assets that
take the form of insurance, "all assets of an employee benefit plan
shall be held in trust ....
Pension and other employee benefit funds had been shaped in
the juridical form of the trust for decades before 1974. The Taft-
Hartley Act mandated the trust form for multiemployer plans in
1947.13 Since 1921, the Internal Revenue Code has insisted upon
the use of the trust as a condition of what we now call "qualifying"
fit Notes 9 (Dec 1986) (edited remarks of Kathleen Utgoff made at EBRI conference, Nov
1986).
12 ERISA § 403(a), 29 USCS § 1103(a).
13 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, § 302(c)(5), 29 USCS § 186(c)(5)
(1982 & Supp 1988).
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a pension plan for tax benefits. 4
The drafters of ERISA intended to "apply rules and remedies
similar to those under traditional trust law to govern the conduct
of fiduciaries.' 1 5 The heart of ERISA fiduciary law is section
404(a)(1), which contains three main subsections. 6 Subsection A
contains the exclusive benefit rule, subsection B imposes the "pru-
dent man" standard of care for trust administration, and subsec-
tion C requires plan investments to be diversified. Each of these
provisions transposes to pension law a major principle of trust law.
The duty of prudent investing, the duty to diversify investments,
and the duty of prudent administration are familiar standards of
trust law.' 7
ERISA's exclusive benefit rule, which is the focus of this arti-
cle, imports into pension fiduciary law one of the most fundamen-
tal and distinctive principles of trust law, the duty of loyalty. As
explained in the Restatement of Trusts, the duty of loyalty places
"the trustee ... under a duty to the beneficiary to administer the
trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary.""' The ERISA ver-
sion states that the fiduciary "shall discharge his duties with re-
spect to a plan solely in the interest of the beneficiaries and... for
the exclusive purpose of... providing benefits to participants and
their beneficiaries."' 9 In ERISA argot this "solely-in-the interest/
exclusive-purpose-of-[benefiting]" language of section 404(a) (1) (A)
is compressed as the "sole interest/exclusive purpose" or some-
times simply the "exclusive benefit" rule.S0 A related provision,
14 Revenue Act of 1921, ch 136, § 219(f), Pub L No 42-98, 42 Stat 227, 247 (1921). The
modern version is IRC § 401(a), 26 USCS § 401(a). As under ERISA § 403(a), so under IRC
§§ 403(a) and 404(a)(2), the requirement of mandatory trusteeship does not pertain to a
plan funded exclusively by insurance or annuity contracts.
"I Conference Report on HR 2, Pension Reform, HR Rep No 93-1280, 93d Cong, 2d
Sess 295, reprinted in 3 Legislative History of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974, 94th Cong, 2d Sess 4277, 4562 (1976) (prepared by the Subcommittee on Labor
of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare) ("Legislative History"). An earlier Senate
report explained that ERISA's "fiduciary responsibility section, in essence, codifies and
makes applicable to [pension plan] fiduciaries certain principles developed in the evolution
of the law of trusts." Retirement Income Security for Employers Act of 1973, S Rep No 93-
127, 93d Cong, 1st Sess 29, reprinted in 1 Legislative History 587, 615.
16 ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 USCS § 1104(a)(1).
17 Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 174 (prudent administration), § 227 (prudent in-
vesting), and § 228 (diversification) (1959) ("Restatement").
Is Id § 170(1).
19 ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A)(i), 29 USCS § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i).
10 The Conference Committee Report captions its discussion of the rule "Exclusive
benefit for employees." Conference Report at 303, reprinted in 3 Legislative History at 4570
(cited in note 15). For similar usage in the courts, see, for example, Washington-Baltimore
Newspaper Guild Local 35 v Washington Star Co., 555 F Supp 257, 259 (D DC 1983), afl'd
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ERISA's section 403(c)(1), contains another formulation of the ex-
clusive benefit rule. This so-called "noninurement" rule requires
that, subject to certain exceptions that become important in situa-
tions in which the pension plan is terminated, "the assets of a plan
shall never inure to the benefit of any employer and shall be held
for the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to participants in
the plan and their beneficiaries .. ".."21 Section 406 of ERISA,
which forbids so-called "prohibited transactions," also implements
the exclusive benefit rule by proscribing various types of self-deal-
ing and other conflicts of interest.22
ERISA's exclusive benefit rule has a half-century of prehistory
in other federal pension legislation. The Revenue Act of 1921 in-
troduced an exclusive benefit requirement into the Internal Reve-
nue Code. As a condition for qualifying a pension trust for tax
deferral, the 1921 Act required that the employer create the trust
"for the exclusive benefit of some or all of his employees . . .-.
Section 401(a) of the present Code carries forward the tax law ver-
sion of the exclusive benefit rule. Further, since 1947 the Taft-
Hartley Act has required that contributions to the multiemployer
plans regulated under that legislation be made "for the sole and
exclusive benefit of the employees ... and their families and de-
pendents .... 24
The tax law exclusive benefit rule has purposes broader than
the duty of loyalty in trust law. A main theme of pension tax law is
the so-called anti-discrimination norm, which seeks to condition
the award of pension tax benefits upon broad pension coverage
within the employer's workforce.2 5 The Internal Revenue Code's
exclusive benefit rule reinforces the anti-discrimination norm when
trust funds are used to benefit owners or other insiders.26 The ex-
clusive benefit rule of the Taft-Hartley Act, by contrast, is meant,
like the ERISA version, to implement trust law notions of the duty
of loyalty. The Taft-Hartley rule has become the cornerstone of a
without opinion, 729 F2d 863 (DC Cir 1984).
21 ERISA § 403(c)(1), 29 USCS § 1103(c)(1). See section VIII of this article for a discus-
sion of the conflict between the noninurement rule and the employer's undisputed power to
recapture excess assets upon plan termination.
22 Id § 406, 29 USCS § 1106.
23 Revenue Act of 1921, ch 136, § 219(f), Pub L No 42-98, 42 Stat 227, 247. See also
note 14 and accompanying text.
2, Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, § 302(c)(5), 29 USCS § 186(c)(5).
25 See generally Bruce Wolk, Discrimination Rules for Qualified Retirement Plans:
Good Intentions Confront Economic Reality, 70 Va L Rev 419 (1984).
20 For example, see Central Motor Co. v United States, 583 F2d 470, 488-91 (10th Cir
1978).
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huge case law, which ERISA now overlaps, dealing with judicial
review of plan administration.2 7 For purposes of the present Arti-
cle, we shall be concerned not with the tax law rule, but with the
exclusive benefit rule of ERISA's fiduciary law.
The duty of loyalty is the centerpiece of the common law of
trusts. The drafters of ERISA had special reason for thinking that
the duty of loyalty belonged in pension fiduciary law. In the 1950s
and 1960s, investigative hearings on the subject of labor union
racketeering held under Senator John McClellan achieved im-
mense notoriety.28 The corruption in the Teamsters union, includ-
ing the looting of union-controlled pension and employee benefit
funds, came to public attention.29 By mandating the trust form
and transposing the duty of loyalty to pension law, the drafters of
ERISA were able to institute a familiar regime to protect pension
funds against internal defalcation. In the post-ERISA period, when
cases of self-dealing have arisen, the exclusive benefit rule (but-
tressed by ERISA's ancillary procedural and remedial measures)
has proved an effective corrective. 30
The exclusive benefit rule works well enough against thieves
and thugs, but the rule sweeps more broadly, and in the less dra-
matic settings the rule has proved more problematic. In many situ-
ations, the exclusive benefit rule, by oversimplifying the nature of
these arrangements, has misdescribed the reality of the interests,
misled the courts, induced inappropriate analysis, and produced
improper results.
II. PLAN TYPOLOGY
The universe of pension and employee benefit plans that
ERISA fiduciary law governs is large and complex. For purposes of
the issues being canvassed in the present article, however, only the
rudiments of plan typology need to be borne in mind.
27 The plan administration cases are discussed in section V of this article.
2' See, for example, The Craggy Man Who Took on the Labor Rackets, Newsweek 39
(April 8, 1957); Battle Over Teamster Funds: When Senators Asked Questions, This is
What a Big Union Did, US News & World Rep 89 (Feb 1, 1957); see also Victor in a 2 -
Year Fight, US News & World Rep 68 (Sept 14, 1959).
219 See Michael S. Gordon, Overview: Why Was ERISA Enacted?, in The Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act of 1974: The First Decade, S Rep No 98-221, 98th Cong, 2d
Sess 1, 10-11 (1984) (Information Paper Prepared for Use by the Special Committee on
Aging, US Senate).
30 For example, see Donovan v Mazzola, 716 F2d 1226 (9th Cir 1983).
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A. Pension Plans and Welfare Benefit Plans
ERISA makes a fundamental distinction between pension
plans and welfare benefit plans.31 A pension plan envisions a pro-
gram of savings during the worker's period of employment, fol-
lowed by distribution to the worker and his spouse during their
retirement. Such a program may endure for decades. By contrast,
welfare benefit plans are conceived to be current expense under-
takings; the liabilities arise more or less concurrently with the rev-
enues. Welfare benefit plans include employer or union sponsored
medical, disability, life insurance, childcare, vacation, unemploy-
ment, severance pay and similar schemes.32 Since these plans have
not been thought to require long-term funding,"3 they have been
exempt from ERISA's funding and vesting rules.3 4 ERISA fiduci-
ary law, however, applies both to pension and to welfare benefit
plans. Especially in the voluminous ERISA case law dealing with
judicial review of benefit denials and other plan decision making, 5
welfare benefit and pension plans are treated indistinguishably.
B. Single Employer Plans and Multiemployer Plans
The typical pension or welfare benefit plan is operated by one
employer for the employees of that firm. These so-called "single
employer plans" may be the result of collective bargaining or may
be sponsored by nonunionized firms. In some industries, however,
particularly those in which employment patterns are episodic and
in which multifirm or industry-wide collective bargaining is com-
mon (for example, the construction trades, entertainment, truck-
ing, the needle trades), individual firms do not sponsor plans.
Rather, the union takes the initiative through the collective bar-
gaining process for establishing the pension and benefit plans, and
numerous employers contribute to the union sponsored plan. Al-
though the Taft-Hartley Act requires equal numbers of employer
and union designated trustees on the board of such a multiem-
ployer plan, union interests tend to prevail and multiemployer
31 ERISA §§ 3(1)-(2), 29 USCS § 1002(1)-(2).
32 Id § 3(1), 29 USCS § 1002(1).
33 Recent experience indicates that the line between pension and welfare benefits is not
well drawn as it affects retiree medical plans. A plan that provides health benefits across a
worker's retirement period is in truth a type of pension plan. On the difficulties besetting
these plans, see generally Bruce D. Pingree, Current Issues in Termination and Modifica-
tion of Welfare Plans, 14 Tax Manage Comp Plan J 311 (1986).
34 ERISA §§ 301(1), 201(a)(1), 29 USCS §§ 1081(a)(1), 1051(1).
"I See section V.
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plans are often called union plans.36
C. Defined Contribution and Defined Benefit Plans
Within the realm of pension plans, the crucial distinction is
between defined contribution and defined benefit plans." A de-
fined contribution plan is best analogized to a savings account. The
plan calls for the establishment of a separate account for each em-
ployee. The employer must contribute to each account at a rate
specified in the plan (for example, five percent of earnings, or forty
cents per hour worked). Each account participates proportionately
in the investment experience of the fund. When the employee re-
tires, the size of his pension will depend entirely upon the size of
his account. TIAA/CREF, the college teachers' pension plan, works
on this principle; the familiar IRA account mirrors it. Another
common variety of defined contribution plan is the profit-sharing
plan, by which a firm allocates some fraction of earnings to indi-
vidual accounts of participating employees. Yet another variety is
the stock bonus plan, through which the firm contributes company
shares rather than cash to the employees' accounts.3 8
The dominant form of pension plan is the defined benefit
plan. 9 In these plans, the employer (or other plan sponsor)
promises to pay a retirement pension according to a formula that
adjusts benefits based on such variables as the employee's length
of service and final salary.40 The employer finances the plan by
making regular contributions to the plan, in accord with actuarial
projections of the sums needed to fund the promised pension level.
Defined contribution and defined benefit plans allocate in-
vestment risk oppositely. Under a defined contribution plan, the
employee bears the burden of disappointing investment results and
pockets the gains from good results. Under a defined benefit plan,
11 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, § 302(c)(5)(B), 29 USCS §186
(c)(5)(B). For a further discussion of the union dominance in multiemployer plans, see text
following note 113.
' ERISA §§ 3(34)-(35), 29 USCS §§ 1002(34)-(35).
3S For further discussion of employee stock ownership, see section IX.
" Ippolito estimates that defined benefit plans held about 70 percent of private pension
assets as of 1984. Richard A. Ippolito, Pensions, Economics and Public Policy 81 (Dow
Jones-Irwin, 1986). See id at 103-05 for an account of the supposed advantages of defined
benefit plans.
40 For example, a typical defined benefit plan might calculate the pension as a certain
percentage of the employee's average salary over his final five years of employment. The
percentage is determined by multiplying the employee's years of service times a number
such as two percent. Thus, in this example, a 30-year employee would be entitled to a pen-
sion of 60 percent of his final average salary.
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the employer bears the investment risk. Since the employer has
promised to provide benefits at a certain level, the employer re-
mains liable to pay the benefits even if the fund turns up short. By
the same token, when investments yield unexpectedly high returns,
the employer's liability to contribute to the plan is correspondingly
reduced.
Multiemployer pension plans straddle the line between de-
fined contribution and defined benefit plans. From the standpoint
of the employee the plan looks like a defined benefit plan, since
the plan sets benefit levels that are not tied to individual accounts.
From the employer's standpoint, however, the multiemployer plan
looks like a defined contribution plan. The collective bargaining
agreement fixes the amount the employer must contribute (for ex-
ample, so many dollars per covered employee per month), typically
without explicit connection to the plan's benefit levels. It is the
trustee's job to align the benefit levels that the plan promises with
the expected contribution levels.41
III. TENSIONS BETWEEN TRUST LAW AND ERISA FIDucIARY LAW
Although ERISA's exclusive benefit rule originates in the trust
law duty of loyalty, it is far from clear that the private gratuitous
trust and the employee benefit plan are really comparable. In this
section, we discuss differences between the ordinary trust and the
pension trust. We suggest that these differences undercut the ra-
tionale for routine application of trust law rules to employee bene-
fit plans. We also discuss the failure of ERISA to address the prob-
lem of conflicts among beneficiaries.
A. Economic Perspectives on Trust Law Fiduciary Duties
The essentials of the typical private trust are familiar enough.
The owner of property, called the settlor of the trust, conveys
property for the benefit of one or more beneficiaries to a third
party, who serves as trustee. The trustee holds for the benefit of
each beneficiary. This donative transfer could have been imple-
mented as a simple gift, from settlor to beneficiary, but that is not
quite what the settlor wanted. Often the beneficiary is (or, at a
11 The 1980 amendments to ERISA, cited in notes 6-8, impose on contributing employ-
ers a set of subsidiary liabilities for shortfalls in certain circumstances. These amendments
make multiemployer plans look more like defined benefit plans from the employer's per-
spective since the employer now bears part of the risk of poor investments or excessive
benefit payments.
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future time when the transfer takes effect, could turn out to be) a
minor, an incompetent, a financially unsophisticated spouse, or
somebody else to whom the settlor fears to transfer outright do-
minion of the property. The trust form allows the settlor to place
active control of the property in the hands of an intermediary, the
trustee, while still directing the benefit to flow to the persons who
are in function donees.
The transferor might in theory design some such arrangement
by contract. Such a contract would be a close substitute for the
trust, but in practice the settlor usually42 prefers the trust form.4
A main reason for using the trust form is that it invokes a devel-
oped set of fiduciary rules that regulate the behavior of trustees. In
addition to the duty of loyalty that prohibits self-dealing, trust law
fiduciary rules regulate the compensation that trustees receive,
prohibit delegation, and impose duties of prudence in investing
and administration.4
The logic of imposing relatively strict fiduciary duties upon
the trustee, especially the stringent duty of loyalty, follows directly
from the distinctive characteristics of the trust relationship. The
trust is frequently used as a governance mechanism in situations in
which the settlor will be dead and in which there is a risk that the
beneficiaries may be impaired or otherwise unsuited to administer
the property. For precisely the reasons that inspire the use of a
third party trustee, neither the transferror nor the beneficiaries are
well situated to monitor closely the actions of the trustee.
The strict fiduciary duties of trust law act as substitutes for
monitoring by the directly interested parties. The duty of loyalty is
prophylactic; its purpose to deter the trustee from engaging in self-
interested conduct at the expense of the beneficiaries. The idea is
to prevent misbehavior by erecting an irrebuttable presumption of
42 The most important exception occurs when the transferror arranges to "settle" life
insurance proceeds for the beneficiaries by means of one of the standard life insurance set-
tlement options. The transferror contracts with the company for the benefit of the benefi-
ciaries. The contract form captures the different role of the intermediary. Unlike the
stakeholding trustee who must segregate the transferred trust property, see Restatement §
179 (cited in note 17), the life insurance company is directly liable for the benefit levels that
it guarantees. In lieu of the fiduciary safeguards of trust law, the insurance beneficiary has
certain regulatory safeguards that reinforce market discipline in the industry.
"' Indeed, the trust is such a fixture of Anglo-American law that we tend not to remem-
ber that it is "an institution unknown in civil-law countries." Donald T. Trautman and
Emmanuel Gaillard, The Hague Conference Adopts a Convention for Trusts, 124 Trusts &
Estates 23, 23 (Feb 1985).
", Restatement §§ 170 (loyalty), 171 (nondelegation), 174 (prudent administration),
227(a) (prudent investing) (cited in note 17). Compensation, id § 242, is largely regulated by
individual state statutes.
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wrongdoing whenever the trustee engages in conflict tainted trans-
actions. The trustee who deals with trust property for his own ac-
count is not allowed a defense even when the transaction was inno-
cent or harmless to the beneficiaries. 5 In such a situation, the rule
of equity actually works to inflict rather than prevent unjust en-
richment, because the trustee's gains are awarded to the benefi-
ciaries even when not made at the beneficiaries' expense.
The justification is not simply that so harsh a rule deters, but
that it deters at acceptable cost. The property of any one trust
fund is minuscule compared to the universe of investment and en-
trepreneurial opportunity that the economy provides. Accordingly,
to wall the trustee off from self-dealing with trust property is sel-
dom an onerous burden.
The weakness of monitoring by interested parties may also
help explain the nondelegation doctrine,46 which prevents the trus-
tee from using substitutes to perform key trust responsibilities
when the settlor is unable to consent. The difficulty of monitoring
also sheds light on the duty of prudent investing, with its charac-
teristic emphasis on low risk investments. 1 Trust assets frequently
constitute a large fraction of the beneficiaries' wealth. If in such
cases the settlor could direct the trustee's investment strategy and
continually monitor performance, the settlor would usually insist
that the trust assets be invested cautiously, to ensure that the ba-
sic needs of the beneficiary (food, shelter, clothing, medical care,
education, and so forth) are met. Since the departed settlor cannot
continually assess the trustee's performance, a substitute monitor-
ing device is required. The duty of prudence, by emphasizing low
risk investing, serves this function.
The fiduciary rules imposed on trustees are not costless. Fidu-
ciary duties restrict discretion. Thus, the rule against self-dealing
prevents transactions between the trust and the trustee that might
benefit both; the nondelegation doctrine restricts specialization;
the duty of prudent investing causes some profitable opportunities
to be ignored; limitations on compensation cause some qualified
individuals to refuse to serve as trustees. In other settings, these
trust law fiduciary duties would be too costly, and the law has de-
veloped differently. In corporate law, for example, managers are
, For example, see Hartman v Hartle, 95 NJ Eq 123, 122 A 615 (Chanc 1923).
4' Restatement § 171 (cited in note 17). We imply no approval of the doctrine.
'7 On the origins of the preoccupation with low risk investing in trust law, see John H.
Langbein and Richard A. Posner, Market Funds and Trust-Investment Law, 1976 Am Bar
Found Res J 1, 3-6.
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also referred to as fiduciaries, yet self-dealing is not prohibited.
Rather, interested director transactions are permitted, but subject
to greater judicial scrutiny. Similarly, corporate law invites exten-
sive delegation. Nor does the bias for low risk investing that distin-
guishes the trust law duty of prudence carry over to corporate law.
Rather, the deferential standard of the business judgment rule ef-
fectively shields most decisions of corporate managers from judi-
cial review.48
These weaker fiduciary constraints are appropriate in the cor-
porate context because a developed set of monitoring mechanisms
tends to align the interests of managers and investors. These
mechanisms are both internal, such as scrutiny by outside direc-
tors and large shareholders; and external, such as the takeover
market. Contrast the trust situation: it is difficult or impossible for
the settlor or the beneficiaries to monitor the trustee,49 and there is
no takeover market for trustees. In order to deter conduct by the
fiduciary that is inconsistent with the wishes of the settlor (and
inconsistent with the welfare of the beneficiaries), trust law im-
poses stricter fiduciary rules. These stricter rules substitute for the
weaker private or market-type constraints.
The stricter fiduciary rules of trust law mimic the contractual
terms that the settlors and trustees would have agreed upon if the
costs of negotiating and enforcing such contracts were zero.50 By
serving as implied contractual terms, fiduciary rules reduce trans-
action costs and thus facilitate dispositions of property that might
not have occurred in the absence of the trust scheme of
governance.
Similarly, in the realm of pension or other benefit plans, it is
impossible to foresee every change in circumstances that may af-
fect the plan, hence the difficulty of specifying in advance by plan
terms or other contractual provisions how conflicts should be re-
solved. Legal rules determine how conflicts will be resolved. The
better these rules are able to approximate the bargain the parties
would have struck had they been able to anticipate and resolve all
the problems, the more willing the parties will be to establish such
48 For a discussion of the business judgment rule and fiduciary duties in corporate law,
see Daniel R. Fischel and Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative
Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 Cornell L Rev 261 (1986).
'0 Unless, of course, the trust instrument retains for the settlor or grants to the benefi-
ciaries the power to replace the trustee.
50 See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions,
91 Yale L J 698, 700-03 (1982), for discussion of fiduciary duties as implied contractual
terms.
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plans.
B. Fiduciary Duties and Employee Benefits Plans
Significant differences exist between the private gratuitous
trust and the universe of pension and employee benefit plans.
These differences have powerful implications for delineating the
appropriate fiduciary duties for trustees and other fiduciaries of
employee benefit plans.
The settlor who creates an ordinary trust for the benefit of one
or more beneficiaries is readily ascertainable. In employee benefit
plans, by contrast, it is for many purposes impossible to distin-
guish the settlor from the beneficiary. Rather, because employee
benefit plans are part of a total compensation package agreed upon
by employer and employee, it is best for many purposes to con-
ceive of employer and employee as both settlor and beneficiary.
In the jargon of benefits law, most plans are "noncontribu-
tory," meaning that the employer writes the checks to pay for most
or all pension and welfare benefits. Nevertheless, these benefits are
not free to employees. Employees pay for pension benefits in the
form of lower wages.5 Thus, employees will bargain for plans only
if the benefits anticipated exceed the income foregone. In this vital
sense, each employee is, together with the employer, the settlor of
his own pension and benefit plans. 52
Pension and other benefit plans will not be established unless
they are in the mutual interest of employers and employees. Plans
are strictly voluntary arrangements. Neither ERISA nor the tax
code nor the labor laws require the firm to offer any of these plans
as a condition of employment. Vast numbers of firms, especially
smaller firms in the retailing, service, and agricultural industries,
have no plans or have skimpy ones.5
Among the mutual interests of employers and employees that
lead to the creation of plans, two stand out. First, compensation in
the form of pension benefits is tax advantaged. Most forms of con-
tribution to pension accounts are tax deferred, meaning that in-
come tax is paid not when the employee earns the money that is
51 See generally Ronald G. Ehrenberg and Robert S. Smith, Modern Labor Economics:
Theory and Public Policy 394-406 (Scott, Foresman, 3d ed 1988).
52 There is an analogy to the incidence of Social Security contributions. While these
contributions are nominally paid by employers, studies demonstrate that in the long run the
burden of the payroll tax rests on labor. See Alicia H. Munnell, The Economics of Private
Pensions 3 (Brookings Inst, 1982) (collecting studies).
83 Id at 199-201; see generally Emily S. Andrews, The Changing Profile of Pensions in
America 47-113 (Employee Benefit Research Inst, 1985).
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contributed to his account, but years later when the money is
drawn down for distribution,5 4 ordinarily during retirement. Fur-
thermore, the investment yield on pension savings accrues and
compounds on a tax deferred basis until distribution.5 Because the
tax laws create an incentive for tax sensitive employees to take
compensation in the form of pension benefits, the employer can
deliver and the employee can receive more value per dollar of com-
pensation through pension benefits than through cash wages.
Tax advantages aside, benefit plans, especially pension plans,
may reduce the overall cost of labor. For example, pension eligibil-
ity and forfeiture requirements, to the extent that ERISA still per-
mits them, reduce employee turnover and thus enable employers to
economize on recruitment and training costs. Similarly, group in-
surance plans, through which a firm buys life, health, accident, or
other coverage for its workers and their dependents, offer signifi-
cant economic advantages over individual policies, primarily by re-
ducing sales, underwriting, and administrative costs. The gains
from reduced labor costs as well as from the tax subsidy will be
shared in some fashion by employers and employees."'
Because in this important sense the employer and the em-
ployee both benefit from the pension or welfare benefit plan, there
is an obvious difficulty in interpreting the exclusive benefit rule.
The plans are established for the mutual advantage of employer
and employee, not for the exclusive benefit of one. The exclusive
benefit rule on its face is inconsistent with the economic realities of
the plans.
The simple trust law model of exclusive benefit does not,
therefore, comport with the reality of the interests in employee
benefit plans. In the private trust situation, the settlor's welfare is
maximized if the beneficiaries capture all the benefits flowing from
the trust. That is why the duty of loyalty requires the trustee to
act in the exclusive interest of the beneficiaries. And because
neither the settlor nor the beneficiaries may be able or suitable to
monitor the actions of the trustee, trust law imposes strict fiduci-
, IRC §§ 402(a)(1), 404(a)(1)(A), 26 USCS §§ 402(a)(1), 404(a)(1)(A).
5 IRC § 501(a), 26 USCS § 501(a); see the discussion in Ippolito, Pensions, Economics
and Public Policy at 20-24 (cited in note 39).
" "[T]he benefit provisions of defined benefit formulas not only serve as a strong deter-
rent to retirement prior to the early retirement age [defined in the plan], but they serve as a
remarkably strong deterrent to job switching, even at very young ages." David A. Wise, ed,
Pensions, Labor, and Individual Choice 9 (Chicago, 1985).
, Precisely how the gains will be shared depends on the elasticities of the supply and
demand for labor.
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ary duties restricting the ability of the trustee to engage in conduct
that might impair the interests of the beneficiaries and thus frus-
trate the intentions of the settlor.
In the employee benefit situation, the settlor's welfare is also
maximized if the beneficiaries capture the benefits resulting from
the trust. The difference is that employers and employees act in
both capacities. The trust exists to maximize the joint welfare of
both. Moreover, because the employer and the employees continu-
ally monitor the performance of the trustee of an employee benefit
plan,58 there may be less need for strict fiduciary duties that limit
the discretion of the trustee to engage in conduct that may be mu-
tually beneficial to both groups.
Notwithstanding the continual monitoring of trustees by em-
ployers and employees, fiduciary rules are still important in regu-
lating pension trustee behavior. In particular, the risk always exists
that the trustee of an employee benefit plan will take self-inter-
ested action (for example, siphoning assets from the pension fund)
that will operate to the detriment of the beneficiaries (employers
and employees). Fiduciary rules (and criminal laws) deter this type
of behavior; in the absence of such rules, the parties would have to
devote additional resources to preventing and detecting the various
forms of self-dealing.
C. Conflicts among Beneficiaries
In focusing on the overlap of employers' and employees' inter-
ests in pension and other employee benefit plans, we risk oversim-
plifying. Overlapping interests are not identical. There are indeed
employer/employee conflicts; there are conflicts among employees;
and there are conflicts with the federal insurance agency, the Pen-
sion Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), that, under Title IV
of ERISA, guarantees most defined benefit pension promises.5 We
illustrate these conflicts by pointing to a pair of recurrent
examples.
"s While individual employees may find it difficult to monitor the performance of the
plan, the same is not true for unions acting on behalf of employees. (There is a high correla-
tion between plan coverage and unionization. Ippolito, Pensions, Economics and Public Pol-
icy at 189-90 (cited in note 39).) Moreover, the reporting and disclosure provisions in Title I,
Part I of ERISA are designed to facilitate monitoring.
19 For a succinct account of how financial risk incides among workers, the firm, and the
PBGC see Munnell, The Economics of Private Pensions at 144-46 (cited in note 52). For an
extensive analysis of this matter, see Jack L. Treynor, Patrick J. Regan, & William W.
Priest, Jr., The Financial Reality of Pension Funding Under ERISA (Dow Jones-Irwin,
1976).
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1. Younger workers versus older.
Employees have diverse interests, and conflicts may arise
among various subclasses. Consider, for example, the decision
about what fraction of employees' compensation should be devoted
to pension saving. There is no reason to think that all employees
will share a common viewpoint on that issue. Younger employees
who are paid on entry-level pay scales and who have houses to buy
and families to launch may see retirement as a distant blip on the
horizon. By contrast, senior employees who are at the peak of their
earning power, who are taxed in higher brackets on current in-
come, and who see themselves only a short distance from retire-
ment, are likely to exhibit a greater proclivity for tax advantaged
pension saving. Indeed, one of the most insightful explanations for
the prevalence of the defined benefit pension plan is Jeremy Bu-
low's suggestion that, because the time value of money skews the
benefits in these plans toward older workers, this type of plan ac-
commodates within a seemingly uniform benefit schedule the con-
flicting preferences of younger workers for lower levels of pension
saving and older workers for higher levels.e"
The choice between retirement security and employment se-
curity heightens the conflict of interest among subclasses of plan
participants. Retirees present the extreme case. They face no
tradeoff between pension benefits and employment compensation.
From their perspective, pension benefits always prevail, even
though some current workers might lose their jobs as a result. The
same is not true for youthful employees. Not only do they have a
smaller percentage of their wealth tied up in the pension plan, but
they will also be more concerned about job security than about
pension benefits. The young employee's income stream from em-
ployment far exceeds that from future pension income, especially
when both streams are properly discounted for the time value of
money. Thus, young employees may support the use of plan assets
to enhance job security by, for example, having the pension fund
buy or vote employer stock to fend off a hostile acquiror who has
pledged to reduce labor costs. Younger workers would be likely to
favor such a policy even if it were to cause the value of the pension
"0 See Jeremy I. Bulow, The Effect of Inflation on the Private Pension System, in Rob-
ert E. Hall, ed, Inflation: Causes and Effects 123, 134-35 (Chicago, 1982). Younger workers
do not go uncompensated for the lower value of their pension benefits. Labor contracts typi-
cally include fringe benefits of disproportionate value to younger workers, for example, ma-
ternity benefits. These current consumption benefits may compensate younger workers for
the reduced present value of their pension benefits. Id.
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fund to decline-contrary to the interests of older employees and
especially of retirees.
The simple truth is that any particular use of pension plan
assets may have different consequences for different classes of em-
ployees. The conflicts that are bound to arise between these classes
greatly complicate the application of the exclusive benefit rule.
The exclusive benefit rule requires a duty of loyalty from the trus-
tee, but when conflicts develop, the rule provides no guidance as to
how to balance the competing interests. The trust law duty of im-
partiality, which requires the trustee to treat divergent interests in
an impartial manner,61 fits logically into the structure of pension
trust law. We suggest that the duty of impartiality should be im-
ported into pension law, and we discuss below how it could be ap-
plied in two settings where conflicts are most severe: takeover bat-
tles and social investing decisions.
2. Shareholders versus employees.
We have previously explained that in a defined benefit plan,
investment risk incides on the employer or other plan sponsor."
Employees are promised pension benefits that are not tied directly
to the investment performance of the pension fund. Thus, the risk
of fund performance is borne mainly by the firm's stockholders.
This creates a potential for conflict very similar to the well known
conflict between bondholders and stockholders. As residual claim-
ants, stockholders typically prefer a riskier investment policy than
bondholders, since the bondholders share risk in the event the in-
vestment strategy results in bankruptcy but do not share in the
upside if it turns out well.
Shareholders face something of this same incentive with re-
spect to the defined benefit pension plan. Even though the pension
promise to the employees does not vary with the investment per-
formance of the pension fund, the losses from poor investment per-
formance will be shared by employees and the PBGC in the event
of severe underfunding or plan defalcation. Thus, shareholders will
prefer a riskier investment strategy than employees. Shareholders
reap the benefits if risky investing succeeds, while the employees
and the PBGC must shoulder some of the loses if the investments
fare badly.
Another bondholder-stockholder type conflict that finds an
" Restatement §§ 183, 232 (reproduced in note 193).
" See text at notes 37-39.
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echo in the defined benefit plan concerns distributions from the
firm. Just as stockholders have incentives to withdraw assets from
the firm to themselves in the form of dividends or other distribu-
tions, they have an incentive to underfund the defined benefit plan
or to withdraw assets from it. We discuss the related problem of
asset reversions in more detail below.
D. The Protective Policy
Pension plans are basically savings plans. The purpose is to
facilitate saving for retirement. The rationale for making pension
plans tax favored is to induce higher levels of retirement saving
than would occur without the tax concessions. Accordingly, from
the perspective of tax expenditure theory, it has become common-
place to view the resulting revenue loss as a tax subsidy. 3 We re-
cur to the point previously emphasized, that the private pension
system is voluntary. Whereas the employer is required to offer So-
cial Security coverage, there is no requirement that the employer
offer a private pension plan. Since compliance with the regulatory
and fiduciary structure of ERISA and of the Internal Revenue
Code is costly, one way to understand the calculus that induces
employers to sponsor pension plans is (1) that the tax benefits out-
weigh the costs of compliance, and (2) that employees will perceive
and value these tax benefits over the benefits of the forgone cash
compensation. Employers have no interest in foisting off pension
plans on a workforce that does not want them. Thus, the patterns
of pension coverage vary greatly across industries and firms, and
pension coverage correlates strongly with the tax brackets of the
workforce.6
Despite the strongly voluntary or consensual basis of the pri-
vate pension system, various features of pension regulation are
designed to interfere with individual autonomy in pension saving.
For example, the anti-discrimination norm-the bedrock principle
of pension taxation-conditions access to tax advantaged pension
saving for a firm's better paid workers upon extensive participation
11 Munnell, The Economics of Private Pensions at 50-59 (cited in note 52); Wolk, 70 Va
L Rev 419 (cited in note 25); Daniel I. Halperin, Retirement Security and Tax Equity: An
Evaluation of ERISA, 17 BC Indust & Comm L Rev 739 (1976). See also Michael J. Graetz,
The Troubled Marriage of Retirement Security and Tax Policies, 135 U Pa L Rev 851
(1987).
" Ippolito tabulates data showing that for the year 1979, 10 percent of persons earning
less than $5,000 per year had private pension coverage, compared to 78 percent of those
earning $25,000 or more. Ippolito, Pensions, Economics and Public Policy at 24 (Table 2-3)
(cited in note 39).
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of the firm's lower paid workers. The rationale is to create incen-
tives for management to induce lower paid workers to engage in
higher levels of pension saving than they would if allowed unfet-
tered choice. 5 Whether this strategy is very successful is open to
question,"" but it exemplifies the idea that some employees should
be protected against their inclination to save too little for
retirement.
Another manifestation of the protective policy in pension law
is the effort to prevent the worker from consuming his pension sav-
ings before he retires. The Internal Revenue Code insists that pen-
sion plans be designed so that distribution in retirement will occur
"over the lives of [the] employee and [his] designated beneficiary
. . ,6. This emphasis on postponing consumption until retire-
ment is reinforced by a spendthrift provision, resembling the
spendthrift restraint that can be created under conventional trust
law. ERISA section 206(d)(1) says: "Each pension plan shall pro-
vide that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or
alienated." '88 (The Internal Revenue Code contains an identical re-
quirement for tax qualification. 9 ) As in a spendthrift trust,
ERISA's spendthrift provision has the effect of protecting the ben-
eficiary's account from the just claims of his creditors. And, in
ERISA trusts, as in spendthrift trust law, an exception is made in
favor of domestic relations creditors (former spouses and depen-
dent children), whose claims are enforced despite the spendthrift
language. °
Although ERISA's spendthrift provision echoes the spend-
thrift trust, there are important differences. ERISA's spendthrift
provision is mandatory, whereas under conventional trust law a
spendthrift restraint is exceptional and must be expressly invoked
" See Wolk, 70 Va L Rev at 429 et seq (cited in note 25).
We are suspicious of the basic idea that an individual needs a tax bounty in order to
make an appropriate tradeoff between current consumption on the one hand and deferred
consumption in retirement on the other hand. But quite apart from that question of princi-
ple, there is considerable reason to think that the bounty does not achieve its goal. Munnell
reckons that perhaps sixty-five cents of the pension savings dollar disappears in the form of
dissaving from nonpension accounts. Munnell, The Economics of Private Pensions at 77
(cited in note 52). On the shortcomings in implementing the coverage goals of the antidis-
crimination norm, see Wolk, 70 Va L Rev at 435 et seq (cited in note 25).
67 IRC § 401(a)(9)(A)(ii), 26 USCS § 401(a)(9)(A)(ii).
68 ERISA § 206(d)(1), 29 USCS § 1056(d)(1).
"' IRC § 401(a)(13)(A), 26 USCS § 401(a)(13)(A).
70 Compare Restatement § 157(a) (cited in note 17), with the current ERISA provision,
§ 206(d)(3)(A), 29 USCS § 1056(d)(3)(A). (The exception for domestic relations creditors
was not in the original Act. It was added by amendment in 1984.).
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by the settlor.7 1 On the other hand, ERISA tolerates greater depar-
tures from its spendthrift protection than is characteristic of a
spendthrift trust. ERISA allows loans and lump sum distributions
in circumstances that seem to undercut the protective policy.7 2
ERISA's spendthrift provision also collides with a basic princi-
ple of black letter trust law, that the settlor of a trust may not
impose spendthrift protections against his creditors for his own ad-
vantage.73 In ERISA trusts there is an important sense in which
the employee whom the spendthrift provision shields is the settlor
of his own pension account, since even contributions that are nom-
inally made by the employer derive in function from the em-
ployee's aggregate compensation. On the other hand, we have em-
phasized that the employer has settlor-like interests in the
employee's pension saving; those interests may extend to the
spendthrift provision. From the employer's standpoint, one of the
advantages of pension saving is that it facilitates superannuation
policy:7 4 The employee who has an assured retirement income
stream is less likely to want to remain on the job beyond his pro-
ductive years. With the stick of the mandatory retirement rules
now severely circumscribed, the carrot in the pension pot is an ever
more important tool in a firm's superannuation policy.
The proper scope of ERISA's protective policy for the most
part lies well beyond the subject of the present article. We have
mentioned these few basics because the protective policy has im-
portant implications for one of the recurrent themes of this article,
the conflicts of interest that exist among different groups of em-
ployees. We shall show, for example, that both in the leading take-
over case and in the leading social investing case, there were signif-
icant conflicts between active employees concerned to protect their
jobs and senior employees or retirees who had no such interest. If
the protective policy were pursued relentlessly, it might lead to the
view that the preferences of active employees should be disre-
garded. Consider, for example, the defined contribution plan-in
71 See Restatement § 152(1) (cited in note 17), providing that a spendthrift trust is
valid if created "by the terms of [the] trust."
72 ERISA § 408(b)(1), 29 USCS § 1108(b)(1), allows loans to plan participants and ben-
eficiaries. IRC § 402 (e)(4)(A) permits lump sum distributions in various circumstances, in-
cluding (when the plan so provides) termination of employment. Most lump sum distribu-
tions result in immediate consumption rather than savings for retirement. See Spend It or
Save It?, 49 Social Secur Bull 15 (Sept 1986).
7' Restatement § 156 (cited in note 17).
7, Everett T. Allen, Jr., Joseph J. Melone and Jerry S. Rosenbloom, Pension Planning:
Pensions, Profit Sharing, and Other Deferred Compensation Plans 7-8 (Richard D. Irwin,
5th ed 1984).
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which, as we have explained before, investment risk always incides
on the employee. The argument would be that if the protective
policy forbids an active employee to resort to his pension account
for current consumption, it should likewise prevent him from ap-
proving pension fund financial transactions that trade lower in-
vestment gains in return for current employment. Either way, the
employee is obtaining current income at the price of a reduced re-
tirement income stream. That argument is, however, overstated.
Current employment supports not only current consumption, but
also pension saving. The employee may gain little if his pension
account is protected at the price of his job. If he cannot be quickly
reemployed in a comparable position, the loss of the job will impair
his future pension saving.
Another reason for limiting the scope of the protective policy
is that, in the situations we shall be discussing, the employee does
not ordinarily act alone, but as a member of a larger group, often
with union representation. The spendthrift clause is premised on a
distrust of the ability of the individual employee to make the
tradeoff between current consumption and pension saving. Even if
this distrust of the individual employee were justified (and we have
our doubts), it should not be mechanically transposed to the better
informed circumstances of collective action.
There is no ground for assuming that if fiduciaries and courts
were to recognize the true contest of interests that exists in various
issues of pension plan governance, the result would be to en-
courage foolish employees to fritter away their pension savings. A
more likely result is that if fiduciaries and courts were directed to
identify and weigh all the relevant interests, they would be better
able to maximize the interests of all the parties. In a world of vol-
untary plan formation, if the contracting parties understood that
the legal standards for evaluating plan decisionmaking had become
more realistic and more reasonable, they would be more likely to
form plans and to establish higher levels of pension saving.
In the remainder of this article, we examine a variety of issues
that have arisen under ERISA in which the common thread, as we
see it, has been the multiplicity of interests in pension and welfare
benefit plans and the distortions that result when the exclusive
benefit rule has the effect of concealing the relevant interests.
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IV. THE NONNEUTRAL FIDUCIARY
The most visible problem with ERISA's exclusive benefit rule
arises from section 408(c)(3), which allows the employer or other
plan sponsor to have its own "officer, employee, agent, or other
representative" serve as trustee or other fiduciary.75 Rather than
insist upon an employee-chosen fiduciary, or upon a wholly inde-
pendent fiduciary (chosen, for example, in the manner of an arbi-
trator), the statute leaves the plan sponsor to pick the fiduciary
and, if the sponsor pleases, to do it from the ranks of management.
Sponsors routinely exercise this authority. In single employer
plans, higher officers of the firm frequently oversee plan invest-
ments while other managers handle various types of benefit deter-
mination. In the union dominated multiemployer plans, it is com-
mon for union officers to wear pension fiduciary hats.
This authorization for the use of nonneutral fiduciaries creates
an obvious tension with the duty of loyalty that is enshrined in the
exclusive benefit and prohibited transaction rules. As the lower
court observed in Donovan v Bierwirth, the most celebrated
ERISA fiduciary case, "section 408(c)(3) expressly contemplates fi-
duciaries with dual loyalties," and this arrangement is "an unor-
thodox departure from the common law rule against dual loyalties
",76
Dual loyalty does indeed appear to contrast markedly with the
supposed duty of exclusive loyalty to the employees. But the ten-
sion disappears once it is recognized that in pension plans, unlike
traditional trusts, employers and employees are both settlors and
beneficiaries. Dual loyalty is simply a recognition of this basic
point.
ERISA allows, but does not require, that the trustee or trust-
ees of a single employer plan be representatives of the employer.
Nothing in ERISA prevents the choice of a union representative or
an independent third party as plan trustee. ERISA allows the par-
ties in creating a pension trust to select whomever they think max-
imizes their joint welfare.
Suppose Congress had adopted the opposite rule; suppose,
ERISA § 408(c)(3), 29 USCS § 1108(c)(3), provides that the prohibited transaction
rules of ERISA § 406, 29 USCS § 1106, shall not be construed to prohibit someone from
"serving as a fiduciary in addition to being an officer, employee, agent, or other representa-
tive of a party in interest." ERISA § 3(14), 29 USCS § 1002(14), defines "party in interest"
to include employers and other plan sponsors.
7' Donovan v Bierwirth, 538 F Supp 463, 468 (E D NY 1981) (citation omitted), aff'd as
modified, 680 F2d 263 (2d Cir 1982), discussed in text at notes 121-26.
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that is, that the sponsor had been forbidden from using its own
people as plan fiduciaries. Concentrate on the defined benefit plan,
which is the overwhelmingly prevalent form of welfare benefit plan
as well as the predominant form of pension plan. Bear in mind
that plan fiduciaries are routinely responsible for making two ma-
jor sorts of decisions: how to invest plan assets, and how to deal
with benefit claims. Under a defined benefit plan, financial risk in-
cides on the employer.7 If plan assets are invested poorly, the em-
ployer is liable for the shortfall. Likewise if the plan is lavish in
paying unfounded benefit claims, the employer bears the cost.
Accordingly, the cost of a firm's pension and benefit plans
comes more or less directly off the firm's bottom line. The effect of
forbidding the firm to conduct investments and determine bene-
fits-functions for which the firm is liable-would be to lower the
rate of plan formation. The firm would be alarmed about assuming
financial liabilities without effective controls. Employers tend not
to write blank checks.
This discussion of the rationale for permitting the nonneutral
fiduciary illustrates a larger point that is one of the major themes
of this article. There is an important distinction between the oper-
ation of a legal rule ex ante and ex post. Viewed from the ex post
perspective, a rule allowing the employer's representative to make
decisions on behalf of the trust appears to be inconsistent with the
exclusive benefit rule. Ex ante, however, this inconsistency abates
when we come to understand that a contrary rule might lower the
rate of plan formation. Employees would not be well served by a
legal rule that decreases the incentive to form plans in the first
instance.
The failure to recognize this fundamental distinction between
the effect of a rule ex ante and ex post has led to doctrinal confu-
sion in the few cases that have discussed section 408(c)(3). In Don-
ovan v Bierwirth, the important takeover case that we discuss in
detail below,7 18 Judge Friendly attempted to reconcile the exclusive
benefit rule with the nonneutral fiduciary of section 408(c)(3) by
downplaying the conflict. Nonneutral trustees must make "their
decisions ... with an eye single to the interests of the participants
and beneficiaries;" nevertheless, they "do not violate their duties
as trustees by taking action.., to promote the interests of partici-
pants and beneficiaries simply because [the action] incidentally
77 See text at notes 37-39.
" See text at notes 121-26.
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benefits the corporation ....
The device of characterizing the benefit to the employer as
"incidental" misses the point by confusing the ex ante and ex post
perspectives. The relevant question is not whether the trustee's
conduct creates only an "incidental" benefit for the employer ex
post, a difficult and ultimately futile inquiry. Rather, the relevant
question is whether the trustee's conduct is consistent with the un-
derstanding that the employees and the employer would have
reached had they bargained over the issue ex ante. Any other ap-
proach will lower the rate of plan formation to the detriment of
employees and employers alike.
The confusion between the ex ante and ex post perspectives is
also evident in the requirement that trustees must act with an "eye
single to the interests of the participants and beneficiaries." The
difficulty with this requirement is that it begs the question of who
the beneficiaries are. If the employer were also understood to be a
beneficiary from the ex ante perspective, the dual loyalty problem
would be greatly reduced.
ERISA creates an apparent tension between its exclusive ben-
efit rule and its authorization of nonneutral fiduciaries, yet the
statute does not mesh the two contrasting principles nor otherwise
guide the courts on how to balance them. That so distinguished a
jurist as Judge Friendly could find no better rationale for self-in-
terested behavior by nonneutral fiduciaries than to call it inciden-
tal is a measure of the power of the exclusive benefit rule to mis-
lead courts about the reality of pension and benefit plans. If the
court tries to adhere to the notion that a plan is for the exclusive
benefit of the employees, then when confronted with section
408(c)(3), which is apparently based upon the counterprinciple, the
tendency is to subordinate it or wish it away, in this instance by
calling it incidental. The better approach, as we have emphasized,
would be to apply the exclusive benefit rule in a fashion that recog-
nizes that for some purposes the employer is also a beneficiary of
the pension plan.
V. PLAN ADMINISTRATION
Plan administrators are constantly called upon to decide
whether benefit claims fall within plan terms. Most such matters
79 680 F2d at 271. See also Foltz v U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 608 F Supp 1332,
1344 (D DC 1985), aff'd in part, vacated in part (on other grounds), 760 F2d 1300 (DC Cir
1985), on remand 613 F Supp 634 (D DC 1985).
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resolve themselves easily, but at the margin there can be doubt
about how particular plan terms apply to particular circumstances.
Judicial review of plan benefit denials has produced an enormous
body of case law.s0 How blind must a worker be in order to qualify
under a disability plan?81 When a worker leaves the firm's employ-
ment, is he entitled to immediate distribution of his profit sharing
plan account, or must he wait until normal retirement age?8 2 When
a corporation sells a division to another firm, and the buying firm
continues to employ the division's workers, does the transfer enti-
tle the workers to benefits under the selling corporation's sever-
ance pay plan? 3 When the employer first reduces wages and later
dismisses workers, are the workers' severance plan benefits calcu-
lated at the reduced or the unreduced rate?8 4
Dozens of such issues are being litigated under ERISA. Sec-
tion 503 of ERISA obliges every plan to have a written claims pro-
cedure, including an internal review process conducted "by the ap-
propriate named fiduciary . ... "85 Further, ERISA empowers
participants and beneficiaries to sue to recover or to enforce rights
under a plan. 8 Thus, ERISA invites this litigation, yet the statute
gives the courts no express guidance about what substantive stan-
dard to apply in reviewing the decisions of plan fiduciaries. Be-
cause ERISA preempts state law on matters relating to pension
and employee benefit plans,8 7 yet is silent about the standard of
review to apply in these cases, courts have had to construct the
standard as a matter of federal common law.
Here as elsewhere in the development of ERISA jurispru-
dence, two older bodies of law have proven influential: the law of
private trusts, in which the courts have emphasized the importance
80 Dozens of reported cases are collected in Charles B. Wolf and John J. Jacobsen,
ERISA Claims & Litigation 79-81 (Federal Publications, 1988).
", See, for example, Pokratz v Jones Dairy Farm, 771 F2d 206 (7th Cir 1985); LeFebre
v Westinghouse Electric Corp., 747 F2d 197 (4th Cir 1984).
82 Severs v Allied Construction Services, 795 F2d 649 (8th Cir 1986); Morse v Stanley,
732 F2d 1139 (2d Cir 1984).
" Compare Harris v Pullman Standard, Inc., 809 F2d 1495 (11th Cir 1987); and Blau v
Del Monte Corp., 748 F2d 1348 (9th Cir 1984); with Simmons v Diamond Shamrock Chemi-
cals Co., 658 F Supp 1053 (E D Mo 1987), aff'd 844 F2d 517 (8th Cir 1988); and Jung v
FMC Corp., 755 F2d 708 (9th Cir 1985).
8, Ahne v Allis-Chalmers Corp., 640 F Supp 912 (E D Wis 1986).
8- ERISA § 503(2), 29 USCS § 1133(2).
86 "A civil action may be brought ... by a participant or beneficiary ... to recover
benefits due to him under the terms of his plan . .. ." ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 USCS §
1132(a)(1)(B).
8, See discussion in text at notes 4-5.
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of allowing the trustees broad latitude in administration;88 and the
law generated by prior federal regulation of pension trusts under
the Taft-Hartley Act. For ERISA, the federal courts transposed
the standard of review they had developed in similar litigation
challenging the decisions of Taft-Hartley multiemployer plan
trustees.89
The Taft-Hartley standard of review is known as the "arbi-
trary-and-capricious" doctrine. Trustees "may be reversed only
where [their decisions] are arbitrary, capricious or made in bad
faith, not supported by substantial evidence, or erroneous on a
question of law."90 We have seen that Taft-Hartley section
302(c)(5) imposes an exclusive benefit rule.91 The arbitrary-and-ca-
pricious doctrine rests on that rule. The reasoning is that when
plan fiduciaries deny benefits unreasonably, they are not acting
"for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees" as Taft-Hart-
ley requires. When the federal courts were faced with challenges to
fiduciary decision making under ERISA, it was a simple step to
adopt this rubric as the basis for review under ERISA's nearly
identical exclusive benefit rule.92
The arbitrary-and-capricious standard for the review of plan
decision making allows a court to defer to the presumed expertise
of the decision maker, much as in administrative law. "Here, as in
other contexts, the standard exists to ensure that administrative
responsibility rests with those whose experience is daily and con-
tinual, not with judges whose exposure is episodic and occa-
sional. '93 In Dennard v Richards Group, Inc., an oft-cited ERISA
case, Judge Brown observed that the arbitrary-and-capricious stan-
dard has been "traditionally used for review of trusts" and "pre-
vents excessive judicial intervention in trust operations." 4
" "Where discretion is conferred upon the trustee . . , its exercise is not subject to
control by the court, except to prevent an abuse by the trustee of his discretion." Restate-
ment § 187 (cited in note 17). The broad discretion of the trustee in plan administration is
circumscribed by rigid rules of fiduciary duty that allow no discretion in certain circum-
stances. See discussion of fiduciary rules at notes 45-50.
89 See Comment, The Arbitrary and Capricious Standard Under ERISA: Its Origins
and Application, 23 Duquesne L Rev 1033, 1035-41 (1985).
90 Rehmar v Smith, 555 F2d 1362, 1371 (9th Cir 1976).
91 See text at notes 24-27.
92 "ERISA essentially codified the strict fiduciary standards that a § 302(c)(5) trustee
must meet." NLRB v Amax Coal Co., 453 US 322, 332 (1981). "The actions of trustees are
subject to the same standard of review under the ERISA's fiduciary provisions as they are
under [Taft-Hartley]." Elser v LA.M. National Pension Fund, 684 F2d 648, 654 (9th Cir
1982).
Berry v Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F2d 1003, 1006 (4th Cir 1985).
" 681 F2d 306, 313 (5th Cir 1982).
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Judge Brown's formulation assumes two propositions: first,
that a deferential standard of review is appropriate to ordinary pri-
vate trusts; and second, that pension and employee benefit trusts
are comparable to ordinary private trusts and entitled to
equivalent judicial deference. We have previously explained why
the strict duty of loyalty in conventional trust law justifies the
courts in deferring broadly to trustee decision making. 5 The trus-
tee who is precluded from self-interested behavior can be allowed
substantial latitude in administering the trust, thereby sparing the
enforcement costs of a closer standard of review. We question,
however, whether that basis for deference should carry over from
the private gratuitous trust to the realm of pension and employee
benefit trusts.
ERISA trustees are not the wholly disinterested fiduciaries
that the common law of trusts presupposed when crafting its
broadly deferential standard of review.96 We observed above how
section 408(c)(3), which authorizes the sponsor to use its own "of-
ficer, employee, or other representative" as plan fiduciary, under-
cuts the traditional duty of loyalty.9 7 Welfare benefit plans and de-
fined benefit pension plans affect the employer's bottom line more
or less directly. When a benefit claim is denied, the employer's lia-
bility is reduced. Yet ERISA invites management personnel to
make these decisions. In this setting, the premise that justifies the
deferential arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review is
questionable.
But the existence of nonheutral fiduciaries does not neces-
sarily compel rejection of the arbitrary-and-capricious standard of
review. First, as discussed above, the parties who establish a pen-
sion trust always have the option of selecting a neutral fiduciary
but typically do not choose to do so. Even in the setting of the
single employer plan with union represented employees, there has
been scant effort to displace management dominated fiduciaries.
This suggests that the levels of abuse are very low. Especially
under health care plans, millions of benefit decisions are made
every week. The fraction that remains contentious is minuscule. In
the vast preponderance of cases, plan terms apply straightfor-
" See text at notes 45-50.
" We speak in the text of single employer plans. As regards multiemployer plans, the
Supreme Court has tried to orient management appointed trustees away from serving man-
agement interests, see NLRB v Amax Coal Co., 453 US 322 (1981). However, the more en-
demic conflict of interest in these union dominated plans arises from the side of the union
selected trustees. See text following note 113.
'" See section IV.
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wardly and the fiduciary's discretion is unimportant.
Second, most plan decision making occurs in the setting of
long term or repeat player relations. Management dominated fidu-
ciaries typically have strong incentives not to acquire a reputation
for sharp practice that would harm morale and cause employees to
assign lower value to plan benefits. Third, in the situation of the
single employer plan in a unionized workforce, the amount of mis-
chief that results from the existence of nonneutral fiduciaries is
minimized by the ability of the union to monitor fiduciary decision
making and to react against abuse. Finally, abrogating the arbi-
trary-and-capricious standard is a step that is far from costless.
The alternative to routine deference is routine judicial displace-
ment of plan decision making in contested cases. While judges may
be more disinterested than nonneutral fiduciaries, they are also
less informed and have weaker incentives to maximize the value of
the firm to the benefit of employers and employees alike. Under
these circumstances, there is no presumption that judicial decision
making would represent an improvement over the deferential arbi-
trary-and-capricious standard.
Sometimes, however, the safeguards that protect employees'
interests in the absence of strict judicial review break down. Union
monitoring and the employer's reputational interest are not likely
to be effective when the long term relationship between the firm
and the union is dissolving, as in plant closings or in corporate re-
organizations. In these cases, the gains from self-interested action
by nonneutral fiduciaries may outweigh the usual inhibiting future
costs.9 8
It is for this reason, we suspect, that the contested plan ad-
ministration cases so often arise when the incentives of the long
term relationship are attenuated. Much of the recent litigation in
which the courts have expressed uneasiness about the arbitrary-
and-capricious doctrine has arisen in a recurrent fact pattern: An
employer who has a severance pay plan for terminated employees
sells a division to another firm. The issue is whether the employees
are severed, since they are removed from the employer's workforce,
even though they have employment continuity with the successor
firm. One factor that sets these cases apart from routine plan ad-
ministration disputes is that, since the employer is shedding the
aggrieved employees (and sometimes their union as well), the long
term relational incentives no longer pertain.
98 See Fischel and Bradley, 71 Cornell L Rev 261 (cited in note 48), for extensive dis-
cussion of this problem.
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Given the complexity of the competing considerations and the
diverse fact patterns in plan administration cases, it is not surpris-
ing that courts have reached inconsistent results. Until lately, the
case law has mostly validated fiduciary decision making, by apply-
ing the deferential arbitrary-and-capricious standard.9 On the
other hand, some courts have been reluctant to apply the arbi-
trary-and-capricious standard reflexively. These courts have devel-
oped various presumptions that overcome the arbitrary-and-capri-
cious standard and impose a burden on the fiduciary to justify his
decision. For example, when the fiduciary adheres to a rule that
excludes a disproportionate number of participants from receiving
benefits, these courts require the fiduciary to justify the rule; and
similar burden-shifting presumptions are applied against plan
rules that work retroactively or that favor junior over senior work-
ers. 100 The decision whether or not the facts justify invoking one of
these presumptions leaves the courts with considerable discretion
and has produced a case law that is sometimes hard to reconcile. 10'
Still other courts appear to have completely abrogated the arbi-
trary-and-capricious standard in some cases. 02
This last group of cases, as our analysis suggests, frequently
involves situations in which conventional safeguards such as union
monitoring and the employer's reputational incentives are not ade-
quate to protect the interests of employees. In these cases, the
courts have been properly sensitive to the possibility of self-inter-
ested action by nonneutral fiduciaries to the detriment of the
employees.
Consider, for example, the strike bound firm whose managers
09 See, for example, Severs v Allied Construction Services, Inc., 795 F2d 649, 650 (8th
Cir 1986). Severs sought lump sum distribution of his profit-sharing account when he quit:
The committee which administers the Plan informed Severs that an accelerated distri-
bution would be granted if Severs would execute a limited covenant not to compete
with Allied for two years. However, Severs refused to do so. Rather, he proceeded to
work in direct competition.... Based upon Severs' refusal to sign the noncompetition
covenant, the committee denied the request....
The court sustained the committee's decision under the arbitrary-and-capricious stan-
dard. See also Fielding v International Harvester Co., 815 F2d 1254, 1256 (9th Cir 1987)
(while agreeing that a conflict of interest existed, the court stated that it will continue to
apply the deferential arbitrary-and-capricious test).
100 Ninth Circuit law on these matters is summarized in Harm v Bay Area Pipe Trades
Pension Plan Trust Fund, 701 F2d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir 1983).
101 For example, compare Harm, 701 F2d 1301, with Shishido v SIU-Pacific District-
PMA Pension Plan, 587 F Supp 112 (N D Cal 1983).
102 See especially, Bruch v Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F2d 134 (3d Cir 1987), cert
granted as Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v Bruch, 108 S Ct 1288 (1988), discussed in text at
notes 109-114.
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were plan fiduciaries in Dockray v Phelps Dodge Corp.03 The pen-
sion plan administrator was the corporation's director of employee
benefits. The plaintiff joined a strike against the firm and the firm
replaced him. When the plaintiff filed for benefits under the plan's
early retirement scheme, the administrator ruled that the plaintiff
did not qualify because he had not been laid off but had quit, al-
though another company official had previously relied upon the op-
posite rationale for excluding the plaintiff from the firm's health
and insurance plans. The court pointed to "countervailing tugs of
divided loyalty" pulling at the plan administrator,0 4 and con-
cluded that it would be "unrealistic to grant the same substantial
deference to the [benefit denial made] ... by an administrator who
is also a senior member of [the firm's] management as we would to
the decision of a wholly independent fund trustee in similar
circumstances."'' 05
In Jung v FMC Corp.,0 6 one of the cases involving the ques-
tion of whether the sale of a division entitles the division's employ-
ees to severance pay under the plan of the selling corporation, the
Ninth Circuit ruled that the fiduciary's conflict of interest justified
a more searching standard of review. "Where, as here, the em-
ployer's denial of benefits to a class avoids a very substantial out-
lay, the reviewing court should consider that fact in applying the
arbitrary and capricious standard of review. Less deference should
be given to the trustee's decision."'' 0 In another of these severance
plan cases, a district judge explained: "Because private trustees
may be less well insulated from private pressures [than are govern-
ment officials] . . . , I have given even more scrutiny to the
evidence.' ' 0
Similarly, in Bruch v Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., the Third
Circuit effectively abrogated the arbitrary-and-capricious standard
in comparable circumstances. 109 The employees who claimed sever-
ance benefits under the Firestone plan were terminated when Fire-
stone sold their division, but the successor employer continued
their employment. The trustee of the Firestone plan, a representa-
tive of Firestone, rejected the claims. Judge Becker emphasized
103 801 F2d 1149 (9th Cir 1986).
10 Id at 1152.
105 Id at 1153.
106 755 F2d 708 (9th Cir 1985).
107 Id at 711-12.
108 Aquin v Bendix Corp., 637 F Supp 657, 668 (E D Mich 1986).
1 828 F2d 134. The Third Circuit's position was foreshadowed in Struble v New
Jersey Brewery Employees' Welfare Trust Fund, 732 F2d 325 (3d Cir 1984).
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that "under ERISA courts must be cognizant of the features that
distinguish the ERISA arrangements from the paradigmatic com-
mon law situation," 110 in particular that in this unfunded sever-
ance pay plan, "every dollar saved by the administrator on behalf
of his employer is a dollar in Firestone's pocket.""' Judge Becker
gave two main reasons for declining to defer to the presumed ex-
pertise of the plan decision maker. First, a benefit denial case does
not ordinarily "turn on information or experience which expertise
as a claims administrator is likely to produce." Rather, the case "is
likely to turn on a question of law or of contract interpretation.
Courts have no reason to defer to private parties to obtain answers
to these kinds of questions." Furthermore, the "significant danger
that the plan administrator will not be impartial ... offsets any
remaining benefit which the administrators' expertise might be
thought to produce." '
In Jung, Dockray, and Bruch, therefore, courts effectively re-
jected the arbitrary-and-capricious standard in situations in which
the safeguards that tend to align the interests of employers and
employees were absent. In these situations, a pension or benefit
plan may be well advised to remit benefit claims to truly neutral
decision makers." 3 Only in this manner can there be any assurance
that a court will consistently apply the deferential standard of re-
view epitomized in the arbitrary-and-capricious doctrine.
In the Bruch case Judge Becker endorsed the arbitrary-and-
capricious standard for Taft-Hartley plans while disdaining it for
ERISA plans. He reasoned that the Taft-Hartley Act, by insisting
on labor-management parity in the trusteeship boards, "assure[s]
that the plan administrator will be neutral.""' We have reserva-
tions about how neutral the boards of Taft-Hartley plans in fact
are; there is a long tradition of union domination in many mul-
tiemployer plans, despite the nominally equal number of manage-
ment and union trustees. In the worst case, a management selected
trustee for a multiemployer plan sponsored by a mobster domi-
nated union risks labor trouble or worse if he defies the wishes of
1 Bruch, 828 F2d at 143.
' Id at 144.
"' Id (footnotes omitted).
113 Notice that in other circumstances in which a plan fiduciary's conflict of interest is
thought to be acute, such as in contested takeover cases, the courts have on occasion in-
sisted on appointing an impartial substitute to replace the regular fiduciary. See, for exam-
ple, Danaher Corp. v Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 635 F Supp 246, 250 (S D NY 1986)
(discussing the point and citing earlier cases).
114 828 F2d at 144.
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the union. Such trouble is directed solely against him or his firm
(not against his competitors in the industry), whereas he suffers no
competitive disadvantage if he lets the union selected trustees call
the shots. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Jimmy Hoffas of
the union world tend to get what they want in multiemployer plan
administration despite the nominally neutral board structure. Nev-
ertheless, the underlying insight in Judge Becker's opinion is
surely correct and worth emphasis: A pension or benefit plan that
does remit benefit denial cases to truly neutral decision makers
should be rewarded with the deferential standard of review epito-
mized in the arbitrary-and-capricious doctrine.
Another recurrent difficulty faced by courts in deciding
whether to apply the deferential arbitrary-and-capricious standard
is whether the existence of a conflict of interest between the
trustee and employees should be determined from an ex ante or an
ex post perspective. Consider the case of a key employee of a firm
who quits to work for a competitor and then demands accelerated
lump sum distribution of his vested benefits. From an ex post per-
spective, it appears that a trustee who is a representative of man-
agement has a conflict of interest. From an ex ante perspective,
however, the existence of a conflict of interest is far less obvious.
Since rules that discourage key employees from working for com-
petitors may maximize the value of the firm to the benefit of all
claimants including employees, denial of accelerated benefits to
employees who attempt to follow this course may be fully compati-
ble with the interests of employees as a class. On the other hand,
the absence of an express contractual provision establishing how
claims for accelerated benefits should be handled when a key em-
ployee leaves to join a competitor makes proper resolution of the
issue uncertain.
Morse v Stanley'1 " illustrates this dilemma. Three key em-
ployees of a firm quit and went to work for a competitor. Each of
the three asked for accelerated lump sum distribution of his vested
benefits under the firm's profit sharing plan, rather than leave the
proceeds invested in the plan until normal retirement age. The
terms of the plan left to the trustees' discretion matters touching
the timing of distributions. The trustees, who were senior manag-
ers of the firm, and who had granted seventy-nine consecutive pre-
vious requests for accelerated distribution to departing employees,
refused the request of the three plaintiffs. The trustees declared
1 732 F2d 1139 (2d Cir 1984).
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that they were adhering to a previously undisclosed policy of not
granting "accelerated distributions to employees who went to work
for competitors in cases where the amount of the vested benefits"
was as large as in the present instances. 116
The Second Circuit sustained the trustees' determination
against the employees' contention that it violated the exclusive
benefit rule. The court reasoned that "[s]ince the Plan is a profit
sharing plan funded ... entirely by employer contributions, the
amount of funding depends upon the amount of profits generated
by the business. ' 117 Accordingly, the trustees could impose a rule
designed to discourage departures and competition without
breaching their duty. The court relied on Judge Friendly's reason-
ing in Donovan v Bierwirth, that "[o]fficers of a corporation often
are trustees of its benefit plan. It is no violation of a trustee's fidu-
ciary duties to take a course of action which reasonably best pro-
motes the interest of plan participants simply because it inciden-
tally also benefits the corporation."" 8 Thus, the conduct of the
firm's managers was held to be consistent with the exclusive bene-
fit rule.
The court's reliance on the premise that the firm received only
an "incidental" benefit as a result of the trustees' decision is sub-
ject to the same criticism that we made of Judge Friendly's reli-
ance on that ploy in the Bierwirth case."" A more plausible basis
for the Second Circuit's result, however, would be to reason from
an ex ante perspective that no conflict of interest existed. 120 Ex
ante, both employer and employees shared an interest in the firm's
profitability: the bigger the pie, the more to go around. Thus, em-
ployer and employees shared an interest in setting up the pension
plan in a way that maximized the value of the firm. The rule in
Morse v Stanley-that trustees are entitled to distinguish between
the claims of departing key employees who go to work for a com-
petitor and the claims of departing employees who do not-is con-
116 Id at 1142.
117 Id at 1146.
'8 Id, citing Donovan v Bierwirth, 680 F2d 263, also discussed in text at notes 76-78
and 121-26.
"' See text following note 79.
o Even from an ex post perspective, there is no conflict between the trustees and the
interests of employees as a class. Rather, the conflict is between those employees who quit
and those employees who remain. The court alluded to this notion when it explained that
"since an exodus of key.., employees plainly reduces the growth and fiscal strength of the
Plan, the Trustees' decision to deny accelerated benefits to the [departing] employees here
could scarcely be viewed as a breach of their duty to administer the Plan in the sole interest
of all its participants." Morse, 732 F2d at 1146.
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sistent with this shared goal of value maximization since depar-
tures by the former group are likely to have a greater adverse
impact on the value of the firm.
While we endorse reliance on the ex ante perspective, it is
hardly clear how Morse would have been decided had the ex ante
perspective been applied. The issue is the familiar one in contract
interpretation of the proper resolution of a dispute when the con-
tract itself is silent. While the trustees' decision to deny acceler-
ated benefits to the departing key employees can be defended as
discussed above, it also can be criticized. Not only was the contract
silent on the issue, but previous requests for accelerated benefits
had apparently been granted routinely, albeit in different circum-
stances. Nor had the trustees articulated and communicated the
supposed rationale for their decision in advance. These facts may
suggest a course of dealing inconsistent with the trustees' decision.
On the other hand, Morse is not a case in which the interests of
employees were devoid of safeguard. The employer had an incen-
tive to maintain a reputation for fair dealing among the remaining
employees.
VI. TAKEOVER BIDS
A. Use of Plan Assets as a Defensive Tactic
Nowhere is the conflict among classes of plan beneficiaries
more prominent than in situations involving takeover bids. Con-
sider the facts in the leading case, Donovan v Bierwirth.121 In Sep-
tember 1981, LTV Corporation made a tender offer for 70 percent
of the outstanding common stock and convertible securities of the
Grumman Corporation at $45 per share, substantially higher than
Grumman's pre-offer price in the mid $20 range. At the time of the
offer, the Grumman pension plan, a defined benefit plan, owned
525,000 shares of Grumman common stock that it had acquired in
the mid-1970's. The trustees of the plan, including John Bierwirth,
its chairman, were also senior managers of Grumman.
Bierwirth and Grumman's other directors took three main
steps to oppose LTV's offer. First, in their capacity as corporate
officers they filed an antitrust suit against LTV. Second, Bierwirth
and the other trustees of the plan resolved not to tender the plan's
shares to LTV, but instead to vote the shares against the merger.
Third, they caused the plan to purchase an additional 1,158,000
121 680 F2d 263 (2d Cir 1982).
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Grumman shares at an average price of $38.27 per share, a price
inflated by the public announcement of LTV's bid.
Grumman's defensive strategy succeeded. LTV's offer was de-
feated and, as a consequence, Grumman's stock price plummeted
to the pre-offer level. The Secretary of Labor then sued the trust-
ees, claiming that their actions violated the exclusive benefit rule
under ERISA. The district court held that the Secretary had
demonstrated a likelihood of success on his claim that the trustees
had acted imprudently. The Second Circuit affirmed, in the opin-
ion by Judge Friendly that we have previously mentioned.12
The Second Circuit emphasized the serious conflict of interest
arising from the trustees' dual role as senior managers of Grum-
man and trustees of the plan. Moreover, the court said, the trust-
ees conducted an inadequate investigation and exaggerated the po-
tential risks to the plan if LTV's offer were successful. The Second
Circuit was especially critical of the trustees' decision, made after
the LTV offer, to purchase the 1,158,000 additional Grumman
shares at $10 per share above the pre-offer price. The trustees were
fully aware, the court observed, that the defeat of LTV's offer,
which the trustees actions made more likely, would likely result in
Grumman's stock price returning to its pre-offer level. This is ex-
actly what occurred. Thus, the Second Circuit concluded that the
trustees' conduct did not measure up to the "high standards" im-
posed by ERISA."2 '
Ultimately, the court viewed Bierwirth as an easy case. ERISA
required the trustees to act with an "eye single ' 124 to the interests
of the plan's participants and beneficiaries. The trustees' conduct
in helping to defeat LTV's offer failed to meet this standard. Thus,
the trustees breached their fiduciary duty to act solely in the inter-
ests of the plan's beneficiaries.
In reality, Bierwirth is a very hard case. Because the plan was
a well funded defined benefit plan-the sort of plan in which al-
most all of the investment risk incides on the spon-
sor-Grumman's stockholders would bear the capital losses from
adverse investment results. Pension plan participants, by contrast,
would be relatively unaffected by investment losses. In their capac-
ity as active employees, however, many of these same participants
might have been harmed by the takeover if, for example, LTV
would have closed Grumman plants or transferred or terminated
122 See text at note 78.
12 680 F2d at 276.
124 Id at 271.
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Grumman employees. Thus, it was rational for workers to oppose
the LTV offer and support plan purchases of Grumman stock to
defeat the offer. This is precisely the position that most Grumman
employees apparently took;" 5 recall that it was the Secretary of
Labor, not the employees, who brought the Bierwirth lawsuit.
From the perspective of Grumman's stockholders, the situa-
tion was different. Not only did they bear the investment losses
incurred by the plan,' 26 but they would have received a substantial
premium for their shares had LTV been able to complete its offer.
The irony of the Bierwirth case should now be clear. The Sec-
retary of Labor sued to redress an injury allegedly suffered by the
participants and beneficiaries of the plan. Most of them, however,
thought that they benefited from the defeat of LTV's offer and
supported the trustees' actions. And in any event, because the plan
in question was a well funded defined benefit plan, the investment
risk was borne by the employer, not by the employees or the gov-
ernment insurer, the PBGC. The shareholders of the firm, by con-
trast, on whom the risk did incide, suffered the true injury, yet
they went unrepresented in the case.
Bierwirth illustrates the problems created by literal applica-
tion of the exclusive benefit rule when a takeover defense works to
the advantage of one of the groups beneficially interested in the
plan (employees) but harms another (shareholders). Under a dif-
ferent plan, the same underlying facts would have produced a dif-
ferent sort of conflict. If the Grumman pension plan had been a
defined contribution plan instead of a defined benefit plan, the
takeover defense would not have affected shareholders, since they
bear no investment risk; but conflicts of interest between different
subclasses of employees would have become noticeable. In a de-
fined contribution plan that holds employer securities in individual
employees' accounts, the capital gain on the sale of shares in a suc-
cessful takeover would accrue to the employees' accounts. This re-
sult is simply an application of the general principle that invest-
125 Id at 265.
126 The Second Circuit held in a subsequent decision that the Plan did not incur any
losses because the Grumman securities purchased by the Plan were eventually sold for a
higher price than that paid by the Plan. Donovan v Bierwirth, 754 F2d 1049 (2d Cir 1985).
We think that decision is quite wrong. The sale occurred almost two years after the initial
purchases. Grumman stock, like other defense stocks, rose in value during the early 1980s as
a result of the defense build up. This increase in the value of defense stocks should have
been irrelevant in determining whether the plan incurred any losses at the time of the trust-
ees' decision to oppose the offer. Instead, the Second Circuit allowed the trustees to appro-
priate by way of setoff the appreciation in trust assets.
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ment risk in a defined contribution plan incides on the
participants rather than the sponsor. For younger employees, how-
ever, the concern over loss of employment may outweigh the bene-
fit from receiving this capital gain. For older employees whose fu-
ture income from prospective employment is smaller and whose
prospective capital gain from the sale of shares is larger (since
longer-service employees will have built up larger balances of plan
shares), the capital gain may outweigh the risk of employment loss.
And for retirees who cannot benefit from future employment with
the firm, only the capital gain has value.
In one of the takeover cases that concerned a defined contri-
bution plan holding shares of employer stock, Danaher Corp. v
Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co.,127 the court addressed in dictum the
trustee's contention that the shares should not be tendered be-
cause the participating employees preferred to defeat the offer.
The district judge rejected this position and held that "the trustees
must discharge their duties by evaluating the best interests of ben-
eficiaries in the abstract as beneficiaries. ' '128 The court recognized
the tension between pension wealth and total wealth that the Sec-
ond Circuit ignored in Bierwirth. Current participants would likely
oppose the takeover bid, the court reasoned, because their jobs
might be lost if a transfer of control occurred. "A participant," the
court acknowledged, "would presumably rather see plan benefits
slashed than lose completely the benefits of employment and inde-
pendence.' 1 29 Yet, the court concluded that participants could not
be trusted to make the decision whether or not to tender. This rea-
soning is a troubling variation of ERISA's protective policy. It is
particularly difficult to understand why the trustee should not be
able to consider the participants' interest in job security. After all,
no job means no further plan benefits. If all plan participants were
similarly situated, the conflict between plan benefits and current
employment that concerned the court would not arise. In reality,
plan participants rarely are similarly situated.130 But this is an ar-
21 635 F Supp 246 (S D NY 1986). The case involved an employee stock ownership
plan (ESOP). For discussion of the relationship between ESOPs and the exclusive benefit
rule, see section IX.
128 635 F Supp at 250.
129 Id.
13I The court worried that if voting rights were to be passed through to employees, "the
vote of lower level employees may well be governed by fear of displeasing either present or
future bosses. This is particularly a concern given the fact that none of Plan participants are
unionized." Id. The court's concern is correct but the remedy lies elsewhere. The Depart-
ment of Labor has insisted that when the plan is designed to pass the votes through to the
employee/beneficiaries, precautions must be taken to prevent intimidation. See Labor De-
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gument for balancing the conflicting interests among the partici-
pants, not for denying the existence of conflicts."3'
B. The Plan as Acquiror
The Bierwirth case raises the question of how to apply the ex-
clusive benefit rule in takeover situations when the target company
is using pension assets for a takeover defense. But the takeover
situation can also pose a dilemma when the acquiring firm is using
pension assets. In Leigh v Engle,'3 ' an acquiring firm and its profit
sharing plan simultaneously purchased shares of potential targets.
As in Bierwirth, the trustees of the plan were also insiders of the
firm. Unlike Bierwirth, however, the plan was a defined contribu-
tion plan, in which investment risk incides on the employees, and
the plan's investments in Leigh v Engle turned out to be excep-
tionally profitable. Approximately 30 percent of the plan's assets
were used to purchase shares in three potential targets. As a result
of the takeover strategies pursued by the firm managers/plan
trustees, these investments produced an annualized rate of return
of about 70 percent on the plan assets deployed in the takeover
schemes. Most of the gain came from two of the investments. The
third investment, in Hickory Furniture Co., provided only a negli-
gible return.
Notwithstanding the profitability of the investments, plan
participants sued the trustees under ERISA. They claimed that
when the trustees caused the plan to use plan assets to purchase
shares of potential takeover targets, the trustees were motivated in
part by the desire to benefit the firm rather than the plan, since
the plan's investments were used to support the firm's acquisition
strategy. The Seventh Circuit held that "the district court clearly
erred when it concluded that plan assets were used exclusively in
the interests of the beneficiaries."' 3 In subsequent proceedings
concerning the measure of damages, the Seventh Circuit upheld134
the district court's finding3 5 that the trustees were liable for
$6704, the amount by which the investment in Hickory Furniture
underperformed a benchmark common stock fund. The trustees
partment Advisory Opinion on Fiduciary Responsibility in Connection with Attempted
Corporate Takeovers, 11 Pension Rptr (BNA) 633 (1984). It seems likely that secret ballot-
ing will be required in such circumstances.
1"1 See the discussion of recurrent conflicts in text at notes 57-72 and 135-50.
132 727 F2d 113 (7th Cir 1984).
113 Id at 124.
114 Leigh v Engle, Nos 87-2548, 87-2609, and 87-2622 (7th Cir Sept 21, 1988).
135 Leigh v Engle, 669 F Supp 1390 (N D Ill 1987).
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were not ordered to disgorge the profits they had made on their
own investment capital in the two successful ventures, on the
ground that the use of plan funds had not been material to the
trustees' gain. The trustees could have obtained capital from
sources other than the plan, and the plan's share of the takeover
ventures was not very large. The court thus rejected the plaintiffs'
claim to capture all of the trustees' gains.
Our analysis suggests a different approach to Leigh v Engle.
As we have emphasized, employers and employees are both settlors
and beneficiaries of pension plans. Thus, the use of pension assets
for the joint benefit of both should not automatically be deemed to
violate the exclusive benefit rule. The difficult issue in Leigh v En-
gle is not the exclusive benefit rule. Rather, the case should have
focused on the issues of prudence and diversification. Because the
use of trust assets to purchase shares of possible takeover targets is
risky, and because workers in a profit sharing plan bear the losses
if the strategy turns out poorly, it could be argued that use of plan
assets for this purpose is imprudent. The fact that the strategy
turned out well no more changes this conclusion than would win-
ning the lottery prove that purchasing lottery tickets is prudent.
Likewise, committing 30 percent of plan assets to investments in
three small firms targeted for takeovers suggests underdiversifica-
tion by the conventional standards of portfolio theory. On the
other hand, the remaining 70 percent of plan assets was invested
conservatively in fixed income securities, which decreased the risk-
iness of the portfolio. The fact that the acquiring firm had special
information about the potential targets (i.e., it was interested in
acquiring them) also lowered the riskiness and enhanced the pru-
dence of the investments.
VII. SOCIAL INVESTING
Over the past decade considerable controversy has swirled
about the topic of social investing of pension and other trusteed
funds. Social investing is commonly understood as an investment
strategy that seeks to achieve some socially desirable goal (however
defined) at the expense of a suboptimal economic return to the
fund. This definition is unfortunate because it lumps together two
quite distinguishable situations: (1) using plan assets for social pur-
poses at the expense of all those persons who otherwise would ben-
efit under the plan; and (2) using plan assets to benefit only a sub-
group of those entitled to benefit under the plan.
The campaign to force pension funds to divest shares of firms
doing business in South Africa typifies the first category. At a min-
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imum, such divestment is inconsistent with maximizing the return
to the fund because divesting the shares of offending companies
imposes additional transaction costs.'86 (Depending on how many
companies must be excluded from the fund's portfolio, some de-
parture from optimal levels of diversification may result as well. 13 7 )
In a defined contribution plan, the plan participants bear these ad-
ditional costs; in a defined benefit plan, the costs incide upon the
shareholders of the firm. Divestment thus poses a conflict between
those who find investment in South Africa repugnant and either
the plan participants or the shareholders who must pay the bill if
the strategy is pursued.
Schemes to use plan assets to bail out failing employers or to
create jobs for union members exemplify the second type of social
investing: attempting to use plan assets to benefit some plan par-
ticipants even if others are hurt. Indeed, the term "social invest-
ing" may be inappropriate in this second set of cases, for the rhet-
oric of social responsibility can obscure the self-interested motives
behind these investment decisions. The much discussed case of
Withers v Teachers' Retirement System 35 illustrates the genre. In
the mid-1970s New York City was on the brink of bankruptcy. Af-
ter exhausting credit from other sources, the City sought to sell
new bonds to the pension trusts of several groups of municipal em-
ployees. As part of a program to prevent the City from going bank-
rupt, the trusts agreed to purchase bonds in the principal amount
of $2.53 billion. The Teachers' Retirement System (TRS), one of
these trusts, committed $860 million of its plan assets to the
purchase. In the litigation that ensued, the parties conceded that
the City could not have obtained the funds on comparable terms
from any other lender.
Plaintiffs in the litigation were TRS retirees. Because ERISA
does not apply to the affairs of state and local pension plans, the
plaintiffs relied upon the common law of trusts. They challenged
the trustees' decision to purchase the bonds as imprudent and con-
136 The New Jersey Division of Investment, which oversees a portfolio with a current
market value of $20 billion, has estimated that it will incur $50 million of transaction costs
in selling the $4.2 billion it has invested in South Africa related holdings (a transaction cost
of approximately 1.2 percent of assets). See Trudy Ring, N.J. Plan Continues Divesting, 15
Pension & Investment Age 3, 51 (April 6, 1987).
137 John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Social Investing and the Law of Trusts, 79
Mich L Rev 72, 77-89 (1980). See also, Ring, 15 Pension & Investment Age at 3, 51 (cited in
note 135), noting that the New Jersey Division of Investments divestment policy has re-
duced the diversification of its portfolio and significantly limited its investment access to
many major industries, including the chemical and automobile industries.
138 447 F Supp 1248 (S D NY 1978), aff'd mem, 595 F2d 1210 (2d Cir 1979).
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trary to the duty of loyalty. The court, although conceding that
under normal circumstances such a large purchase of highly specu-
lative and unmarketable bonds would violate the trustees' fiduci-
ary duties, rejected the plaintiffs' claims. The trustees, the court
concluded, were entitled to take extraordinary action to stave off
the City's bankruptcy.
In reaching this result, the court dealt explicitly with the
plaintiffs' argument that the duty of loyalty (the common law ana-
logue to ERISA's exclusive benefit rule) should have prevented the
trustees from considering the welfare of New York City or even the
preservation of employees' jobs. After reviewing the evidence, the
court found that "neither the protection of the jobs of the City's
teachers nor the general public welfare were factors which moti-
vated the trustees in their investment decision." '139 Rather, the
court stated, extending "aid to the City was simply a means-the
only means, in their assessment-to the legitimate end of prevent-
ing the exhaustion of the assets of the TRS in the interest of all of
the beneficiaries."140
Thus, the court held that the trustees' action complied with
the duty of loyalty. (Had the case arisen under ERISA, this result
would have rested on the exclusive benefit rule.) The court was
probably correct in its assessment that the trustees were not moti-
vated by a concern for "the general public welfare." The court's
conclusion that the investment was in the interest of all benefi-
ciaries is, however, false. If the City had been unable to repay the
loan, the more senior beneficiaries (such as the retirees who were
the plaintiffs in Withers) who had the largest claims and whose
claims were vested could have been harmed by the trustees' deci-
sion. The $860 million that would have gone primarily, if not
wholly, to them would have been lost.
More junior beneficiaries, by contrast, were benefited by the
trustees' actions. The further they were from retirement, the more
their ultimate retirement benefits depended upon the City remain-
ing solvent and making contributions to the fund."" Moreover, al-
though the court dismissed the significance of this point, many
teachers would have lost their jobs if the City went bankrupt.
Withers, 447 F Supp at 1256.
14 Id (emphasis added).
11 Notice the analogy to the situation that confronts different classes of creditors of a
bankrupt firm. Senior creditors will typically prefer to liquidate the firm and get paid in
full. Junior creditors, by contrast, who may receive nothing if the firm is liquidated, will
typically prefer to reorganize.
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Thus, junior beneficiaries also benefited because the trustees' deci-
sion increased their prospects of retaining their jobs. In reality,
therefore, the trustees' decision in Withers to provide aid to New
York City involved a wealth transfer from older to younger benefi-
ciaries. By incorrectly characterizing the trustees' decision as being
in the interests of all beneficiaries, the court failed to appreciate
the conflict between classes of beneficiaries and thus made the case
seem easier than it actually was.
It is interesting to compare Withers with Blankenship v
Boyle, ' 42 a pre-ERISA case that the court in Withers purported to
distinguish. In Blankenship, the trustees of a United Mine Work-
ers (UMW) pension and benefit fund authorized the purchase of
large quantities of shares in certain electric utility companies. The
purpose of these share purchases was to gain a position of influ-
ence with the utilities in order to pressure them into purchasing
union mined coal. The fund benefited if the utilities purchased ad-
ditional union coal, because the agreement between the UMW and
the coal operators required the operators to pay a royalty to the
fund for every ton of coal mined.
Notwithstanding this benefit to the fund from additional
purchases of coal, the court found that the trustees' actions were
primarily for the benefit of the UMW and the operators and not
for the participants of the fund. The court held that the trustees'
actions presented a "clear case of self-dealing... and constituted a
breach of trust. 1 43 The court went on to enjoin "the trustees from
operating the Fund in a manner designed in whole or in part to
afford collateral advantages to the Union or the operators."' 44
What the court in Blankenship overlooked, however, was that
most of the members of the union were also beneficiaries of the
fund. Moreover, because of the royalty provision, the total receipts
of the fund were a function of the amount of coal sold. Thus, the
sale of coal benefited the union and the fund.
The court in Blankenship made the opposite mistake from
that made in Withers. While the court in Withers pretended that
no conflict between classes existed, the court in Blankenship exag-
gerated the extent to which conflicts existed. In reality, Blanken-
ship and Withers involved a similar phenomenon-the use of plan
assets meant to assure retirement income for the purpose of in-
creasing current employment. To be sure, only some beneficiaries,
142 329 F Supp 1089 (D DC 1971).
143 Id at 1106.
144 Id at 1113.
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particularly younger workers, may have benefited, but this was
true in both cases. That some beneficiaries would benefit dispro-
portionately thus does not provide a basis for distinguishing the
cases.
A more plausible basis for distinguishing the cases, though not
mentioned in either opinion, is the different degree of probability
that these particular uses of plan assets would achieve their in-
tended results. In Withers, the plan provided financial assistance
to the City and thus increased the chances that bankruptcy would
be avoided. In Blankenship, by contrast, it is unclear whether the
stock purchases would have increased the demand for union mined
coal. We assume that the reason the utilities had been unwilling to
purchase union mined coal before the union inaugurated its stock
purchase scheme was that union mined coal was more expensive
than nonunion mined coal. If the union had acquired enough stock
to achieve effective control, the union could have forced the utili-
ties to purchase the more expensive coal. But this action would
have depressed the value of the utilities' stock, including that held
by the fund. Moreover, the other shareholders of the utilities could
have attacked such a course of action, probably successfully, as a
violation of the corporate law anti-self-dealing rules. Thus, the
twin prospects of loss on the share investments and legal liability if
the program had succeeded in its purposes may have made the
scheme look very silly-indeed, silly enough to be imprudent.
Neither Withers nor Blankenship interpreted ERISA's exclu-
sive benefit rule, since ERISA governed neither. The Department
of Labor's ERISA oversight staff has consistently taken the posi-
tion that the exclusive benefit rule forbids investment strategies
that are designed to trade suboptimal financial returns for other
goals. In 1979 the then-administrator of ERISA, Ian D. Lanoff, ex-
pressed the view that investing must be done "to protect the re-
tirement income of the plan's participants," and that ERISA for-
bids "investment decisions based on other objectives, such as to
promote the job security of a class of current or future partici-
pants. 14 5 A principal reason most of the pressures for social in-
vesting in recent years have been directed at ERISA-exempt funds,
such as state and local pension plans and university and other
charitable endowments, is that within the universe of private pen-
sion funds that ERISA governs, the perception has been that the
exclusive benefit rule forecloses the issue.
"I Ian D. Lanoff, The Social Investment of Private Pension Plan Assets: May It Be
Done Lawfully under ERISA?, 31 Labor L J 387, 389 (1980).
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Recently, however, in Donovan v Walton,146 a federal district
court proved less sensitive to the language and the logic of
ERISA's exclusive benefit rule in the social investing context. The
case dealt with the effort of a multiemployer plan to invest pension
plan assets for the purpose, in part, of creating jobs for union
members. The trustees of the Operating Engineers Local 675 Pen-
sion Trust Fund decided to purchase and develop ninety-five acres
of land in Broward County, Florida. Only firms whose employees
were represented by the union were allowed to bid for develop-
ment and construction contracts.
The Department of Labor sued, claiming among other things
that the scheme was imprudent and contrary to the exclusive bene-
fit rule. The district court rejected these claims. With respect to
the exclusive benefit issue, the court stated: "To be sure, the Union
derives some benefit from . . .the Fund's requirement that con-
tractors ... be party to collective bargaining agreements providing
for pension fund participation.' ' 7 However, this was not inconsis-
tent with the exclusive benefit rule because the court concluded
that these benefits derived by the Union "are parallel to and insep-
arable from the benefits derived from the Fund and its partici-
pants.'14 8 Finally, "[e]ven without these benefits to the Fund," the
court emphasized, the exclusive benefit rule "simply does not pro-
hibit a party other than a plan's participants and beneficiaries
from benefitting in some measure from a prudent transaction with
the plan."' 9 The court appears to be saying that the union can
benefit provided the plan and its beneficiaries also benefit. This
rationale echoes Judge Friendly's "incidental benefit" stratagem in
Donovan v Bierwirth. e5 0
A program of restricting bidders to those companies whose
workers were represented by the union increases the costs and
hence lowers the return to the fund. The companies who employ
the presumably higher priced union labor benefit, as do their work-
ers. Younger workers who otherwise would have never been hired
or would have been laid off in the absence of the new jobs created
benefit the most. Older workers protected by seniority rules benefit
146 609 F Supp 1221 (S D Fla 1985), aff'd per curiam, sub nom Brock v Walton, 794 F2d
586 (11th Cir 1986), rehearing en banc denied without opinion, 802 F2d 1399 (11th Cir
1986).
147 Id at 1245.
148 Id.
149 Id.
1 0 680 F2d 263, discussed in text at notes 76-78.
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less. But the fund loses.1 51 Thus, the workers who are both mem-
bers of the union and participants in the plan must balance their
gains as union members against their losses as plan participants.
Retirees, however, will have no gains as employees but only losses
as plan participants. Thus, one important perspective on Walton is
to understand it as a scheme by which active workers, particularly
younger workers, and their employers appropriate wealth from re-
tirees and perhaps from older workers as well.
VIII. ASSET REVERSION
Under a defined benefit plan the employer or other sponsor
promises pension benefits whose amount and ultimate cost turn on
a host of future variables-turnover in the workforce, inflation
rates, salary levels, return on investment of pension fund assets,
and many others. 52 Contributions to the plan are based upon actu-
arial projections meant to take account of these factors, but the
limits of human foresight cause discrepancies to arise between pro-
jection and result. Thus, the potential for underfunding or for
overfunding inheres in the nature of a defined benefit plan.
When underfunding materializes, it is good actuarial practice
(now reinforced by ERISA's funding requirements153) for the plan
to revise its assumptions in order to increase the contribution
levels or to take other measures to bring funding and benefits into
alignment. When, on the other hand, a plan becomes overfunded,
the sponsor can cause the disparity to abate simply by reducing or
eliminating further contributions while new benefit entitlements
accrue against the fund. Alternatively, the employer may be
tempted to recover the surplus.
From the employer's standpoint, the purpose of the pension
fund is to pay off the employer's pension promises. We have seen
that the distinctive trait of a defined benefit pension plan, in com-
parison with a defined contribution plan, is that the employer
bears the investment risk.15 4 Since the employer is responsible for
paying the promised benefits and must make up the shortfall if the
15, The losses to the fund may have been partially offset by an increase in employer
contributions. Apparently, the level of contributions to the plan in the Walton case was a
function of the number of covered hours worked. 609 F Supp at 1226. As the number of
hours increased, however, so did the losses to the fund, because it was purchasing that much
more higher priced labor.
'12 Dan M. McGill and Donald S. Grubbs, Jr., Fundamentals of Private Pensions 239-
63 (Irwin, 6th ed 1988).
153 ERISA § 301 et seq, 29 USCS § 1081 et seq.
15, See text at notes 37-39.
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plan becomes underfunded, the employer reasons that he should
be able to recover the gain if the plan becomes overfunded. Indeed,
the technique of ceasing contributions while creating new liabilities
against an overfunded plan is an indirect way for the employer to
spend the surplus.
ERISA, however, provides no direct mechanism for the em-
ployer to withdraw surplus assets from a continuing pension plan.
It is unclear why the statute does not address this problem. The
subject received scant attention in the drafting process.
Overfunded plans were quite rare in the pre-ERISA period, and
the Congressional staffs who worked on the early drafts of the leg-
islation did not pay the matter much attention. To the extent that
the drafters thought about it, they reckoned "that overfunded
plans were the product of an excessive forfeiture rate among plan
participants due to lack of adequate vesting," hence that ERISA's
vesting provisions would cause "overfunded plans .. . [to] disap-
pear altogether." 155
Because ERISA does not expressly authorize the employer to
withdraw surplus assets from an ongoing plan, the exclusive bene-
fit rule would forbid such a withdrawal. ERISA's section 403(c) (1),
sometimes called the "noninurement" version of the exclusive ben-
efit rule, says that "the assets of a plan shall never inure to the
benefit of any employer and shall be held for the exclusive pur-
poses of providing benefits to participants in the plan and their
beneficiaries. 1 56 Even though the purpose of this language may
have been to prevent a pension plan from becoming underfunded,
and hence insufficient to discharge its obligations, the statute does
not speak in those terms. Thus, if an employer tried to write him-
self a check from the assets of an overfunded pension plan on the
ground that the plan no longer needed all its money, the employer
would surely violate the exclusive benefit rule.
Yet ERISA expressly authorizes the employer to recover sur-
plus pension assets by another avenue-as an incident to the ter-
mination of the plan, when all accrued benefits and other liabilities
have been paid.157 In the 1980s the practice of terminating a pen-
155 Michael S. Gordon, Legislative and Regulatory History of the Asset Reversion Pro-
vision in ERISA 7 (unpublished paper, May 11, 1984), reprinted in Overfunded Pension
Plans, Joint Hearing before the Select Committee on Aging and the Subcommittee on La-
bor-Management Relations of the Committee on Education and Labor, House of Represent-
atives, 99th Cong, 1st Sess 89, 95 (1985) ("Overfunded Pension Plans").
15 ERISA § 403(c)(1), 29 USCS § 1103(c)(1), discussed in text at note 21.
157 ERISA § 4044(d)(1), 29 USCS § 1344(d)(1), provides for distributing to the em-
ployer "any residual assets of a single-employer plan" once "all liabilities of the plan to
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sion plan for the purpose of capturing the surplus (so-called "asset
reversion") has become highly controversial. A trickle of such cases
in the early years of ERISA attracted scant notice,"'8 but in 1981
two prominent firms -the publishing house of Harper & Row and
the A&P grocery store chain-terminated their plans as part of
major corporate restructurings. Those cases provoked lawsuits and
Congressional hearings. 159 Beginning in 1982, the runup in the
stock and bond markets caused pension plan assets to experience a
huge increases in value. The number of overfunded plans bur-
geoned, and so did the number of terminations whose purpose was
to recapture the reversion for the employer.1 60
A firm that terminates an overfunded defined benefit plan fre-
quently replaces the terminated plan with a new plan. Such a "ter-
mination/reestablishment" transaction has the effect of manipulat-
ing ERISA's termination provisions to achieve a result that
resembles withdrawal of assets from an ongoing plan-just the
power that ERISA does not grant to the employer, and that the
exclusive benefit rule by its terms would forbid. A set of guidelines
promulgated in 1984 by the so-called "ERISA Agencies" (the De-
partment of Labor, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation,
and the Internal Revenue Service) facilitates termination transac-
tions that are designed to offer substitute pension coverage for the
employees.161 The rationale for the guidelines is that since the em-
participants and their beneficiaries have been satisfied .... " Section 4044(d)(1) was
amended in 1980 to exclude multiemployer plans.
'58 For example, In re C.D. Moyer Co. Trust Fund, 441 F Supp 1128 (E D Pa 1977),
aff'd without opinion, 582 F2d 1273 (3rd Cir 1978), and also aff'd without opinion sub nom,
Appeal of Pension Ben. Guaranty Corp., 582 F2d 1275 (3rd Cir 1978), discussed in text at
notes 170-73.
"I' Walsh v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc., 726 F2d 956 (3d Cir 1983); District
65, UAW v Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 576 F Supp 1468 (S D NY 1983); Hearings
before the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, United States Senate on Francis
Xavier Lilly, of Maryland, to be Solicitor U.S. Department of Labor, S Hrg 98-1118, 98th
Cong, 2d Sess (1984); Pension Asset Raids, Hearing before the Select Committee on Aging,
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee Publication 98-438, 98th Cong, 1st Sess (1983).
"0 The Dow Jones Industrial Average advanced from a 1982 low of 776.92 on August 12
of that year to year-end highs of 1046.54, 1258.94, 1211.57, 1546.67, and 1895.95 in 1982-
1986. On the decline in interest rates and the related bull market as one of the main causes
of overfunding, see Statement of Jeremy Bulow, The Termination of Overfunded Pension
Plans, in Overfunded Pension Plans at 256, 256-57 (cited in note 155). For data showing the
increase in plan termination reversions over these years, see Gerald D. Facciani, Asset Re-
version Policy-Past, Present and Future, in 1 Pension and Profit Sharing, 11105, at 1214
(Prentice-Hall, 1986).
161 The guidelines were issued May 23, 1984 (PBGC News Release 84-23) and reprinted
in CCH Pension Plan Guide 10,185L, at 13,599-601 (CCH, 1988). For the Reagan Adminis-
tration's view of the benign effect of the guidelines, see Statement of David M. Walker,
Acting Executive Director, Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp., in Overfunded Pension Plans
19881 1151
The University of Chicago Law Review
ployer has the undoubted power to terminate the plan and recap-
ture the reversion without providing for replacement pension ar-
rangements, it is better to encourage him to exercise his power to
terminate the plan in a manner that results in substitute pension
coverage for the employees.
The boom in terminating plans for asset reversion that oc-
curred in the 1980s set off a political struggle that continues to the
present day. Opponents of asset reversion, who tend to be allied
with organized labor, would prohibit the employer from recaptur-
ing plan assets. The Reagan Administration has opposed that pro-
hibition but supported a 10 percent tax on asset reversions, which
was enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986,62 and which
was meant to discourage termination transactions.'63
The present article is not the place to canvass the arguments
about altering ERISA to restrict or prohibit asset reversion.6 4 We
wish to make quite a different observation about the experience
at 114-18 (cited in note 155).
162 IRC § 4980, 26 USCS § 4980 (Supp 1988). See generally Norman P. Stein, Taxing
Reversions from Pension Plans, 35 Tax Notes 1131 (1987).
162 Recently, the Administration has favored a proposal that would allow withdrawals
from an ongoing plan, provided that the plan retains a contingency reserve 25 percent in
excess of accrued benefits. For a brief description see Lee A. Sheppard, Administration Pro-
poses to Up the Ante for Defined Benefit Plans, 34 Tax Notes 743, 745-46 (1987).
164 The main issue is whether plan participants should have a larger claim than ERISA
§ 4044(d)(1) recognizes. Present law, as amplified by the ERISA Agencies' Guidelines (cited
in note 161), recognizes no interest beyond presently accrued benefits.
A terminating plan must pay off all accrued benefits, including those that are not yet
vested and would be forfeitable if the participant were to terminate his employment. It has
been argued, however, that employees expect benefit improvements over the course of em-
ployment, in part to compensate for future expected inflation, and that the presently pro-
tected accrued benefits understate the employees' expectations in the fund. The lawyer for
the participants in the Harper & Row case (discussed in text at notes 174-75) contended in
Congressional testimony: "The crux of the matter is that ... participants and beneficiaries
have a reasonable expectation that a defined benefit plan will be continued unless some
legitimate business necessity compels the employer to abandon it." Michael S. Gordon,
Statement, in Overfunded Pension Plans at 76 (cited in note 155). This expectation has
been called an implied term of the pension contract, and the argument has been made that
asset reversion violates that term. Ippolito, Pensions, Economics and Public Policy at 239,
250 (cited in note 39).
The great difficulty with this argument is that it begs the question of why so important
a term would be left implicit rather than made explicit. The employees, who are often repre-
sented in pension negotiations by capable labor unions (such as the UAW in the Harper &
Row case) would seem to have every incentive to see to it that so important a term of the
pension contract be spelled out. The persistent failure to spell out the term suggests that it
does not exist.
Ippolito is wrong in suggesting (id at 250) that there is no effective legal mechanism by
which a plan sponsor can contract away the right to the reversion of pension assets. See the
cases cited in note 177.
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with asset reversion under ERISA. Asset reversion is an area in
which the statute has guided the courts to a straightforward and
predictable case law, because ERISA expressly abridges the exclu-
sive benefit rule to take account of the employer's interest in the
pension fund. ERISA prefaces both the "sole interest/exclusive
purpose" rule'65 and the noninurement rule"66 with provisos that
limit both rules to circumstances not governed by section 4044,
(the provision whose subsection (d)(1) authorizes asset reversion
upon termination of the plan after all the plan's liabilities have
been discharged). 7
The typical asset reversion case involves a plan that contains
the standard inflexible exclusive benefit and noninurement lan-
guage' 68 (terms that facilitate tax qualification). The plan also pro-
vides (or is amended 69 to provide) the employer with a power to
terminate; the employer then exercises the power. In litigation, the
plan participants, as plaintiffs, invoke the exclusive benefit rule;
the employer trumps them by pleading his section 4044(d)(1) au-
thority. In the first asset reversion case to arise under ERISA, In
re C.D. Moyer Co. Trust Fund,7 0 the court worked its way through
the language of the plan and the statute and upheld the reversion
as "consistent with the policies underlying the enactment of
ERISA."'' The court's reasoning has proved influential 7 2 in later
cases. "Employers... will not be penalized for overfunding in 'an
abundance of caution' or as a result of a miscalculation on the part
of an actuary. Thus, employees will continue to be protected to the
extent of their specific benefits, but will not receive any windfalls
due to the employer's mistake in predicting the amount necessary
to keep the Plan on a sound financial basis."'" 3
In District 65, UAW v Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., the
6I ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 USCS § 1104(a)(1), discussed in text at notes 19-20.
166 ERISA § 403(c)(1), 29 USCS § 1103(c)(1), discussed in text at note 21.
117 Extracted in note 157.
"' See, for example, In re C.D. Moyer Co. Trust Fund, 441 F Supp 1128, 1131 (E D Pa
1977).
69 ERISA § 402(b)(3), 29 USCS § 1102(b)(3), requires that every plan be amendable,
and that the plan identify the persons who have authority to amend the plan.
170 441 F Supp 1128 (E D Pa 1977).
. Id at 1132.
172 See, for example, Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild v Washington Star Co.,
555 F Supp 257, 260 (D DC 1983); see also Bryant v International Fruit Products Co., Inc.,
793 F2d 118 (6th Cir 1986), cert denied, 479 US 986 (1986), rev'g 604 F Supp 890 (S D Ohio
1985), where both majority and dissent wrestled with the view developed in Moyer, quoted
in text at note 173, that allowing employees to capture the reversion in a defined benefit
plan rewarded them with "windfalls."
17I Moyer, 441 F Supp at 1132-33.
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court held "that the decision to terminate the [plan] is exempt
from ERISA's fiduciary standards."' 4 The court explained that
both sections 403(c)(1) (noninurement) and 404 (sole interest/ex-
clusive purpose) "contain exceptions when the challenged conduct
involves termination."' 75 An employer can still lose an asset rever-
sion case-by neglecting to preserve the power to recapture the as-
sets 76 or by contracting the power away. 7 7 But as a matter of
ERISA law the employer is entitled to the reversion (now subject
to the 10 percent tax), unless he waives that right, for example, by
the terms of the plan or by the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement or other contract. The Department of Labor, which
oversees ERISA fiduciary law, "has consistently taken the position
that the decision to terminate a pension plan is .. .a settlor, or
business activity and is therefore not subject to ERISA's fiduciary
duty requirements."' 78 When asset reversion gives rise to litigation,
therefore, the case usually turns on construction of the plan or
contract, not on whether ERISA fiduciary law allows the reversion.
From the perspective of ERISA's exclusive benefit rule, we
emphasize the irony of the experience with asset reversion. ERISA
permits the employer to appropriate plan assets, the largest con-
ceivable invasion of a trust fund, whereas it treats conduct that is
much less threatening to the plan (such as the value-enhancing
machinations of the defendants in Leigh v Engle) 79 as being in
breach of ERISA's fiduciary duties. This irony is, of course, easily
explained. In the sphere of asset reversion, ERISA expressly limits
the exclusive benefit rule to take account of the employer's interest
in the pension assets.
IX. ESOPs
The so-called stock bonus plan is a type of defined contribu-
tion plan in which the employer contributes company securities
rather than cash to the individual accounts of the participating
114 576 F Supp 1468, 1477 (S D NY 1983).
'" Id at 1478, citing the proviso that cross-references to, inter alia, ERISA § 4044, 29
USCS § 1344.
116 Audio Fidelity Corp. v Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 624 F2d 513 (4th Cir 1980).
117 A divided court in Bryant, 793 F2d 118, held that the employer had contracted away
its reversion power. This rationale was also invoked in Delgrosso v Spang & Co., 769 F2d
928 (3d Cir 1985).
178 Opinion Letter of Dennis M. Kass, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Dept. of Labor, March
13, 1986, reprinted as Labor Department Letter on Fiduciary Responsibility and Plan Ter-
minations, 13 Pension Rptr (BNA) 472 (1986).
'19 727 F2d 113 (7th Cir 1984), discussed in text following note 132.
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employees. In 1974 ERISA authorized a specially tax advantaged
version, the employee stock ownership plan (ESOP). s0 ESOPs
have become prominent and problematic in a variety of settings. In
the present article we touch upon a single dimension of the
ESOP-the tension between it and the exclusive benefit notion.
The ESOP is best understood as a tool of corporate finance.
The ESOP borrows money from a lender to buy employer stock
from the employer. The employer guarantees to contribute enough
money to the ESOP each year to permit the ESOP to service the
debt and retire the principal amount of the loan. These annual
contributions to the ESOP are fully tax deductible. Much as with
debt financing, the employer has raised capital while effectively as-
suming the obligations to repay a loan. The advantage to an em-
ployer is that by utilizing an ESOP rather than conventional debt,
the contributions to the ESOP are fully deductible, including the
portion of the contribution that is functionally the equivalent of
the repayment of principal on the loan. The ESOP thereby enables
"the corporation to finance its capital requirements with pre-tax
dollars." ''
Increasing the employee's holdings of stock in his employer
through ESOPs has been lauded as people's capitalism. Related
claims made on behalf of ESOPs are that they increase savings and
productivity, save jobs, and redistribute wealth. 8 One indication
that such claims are overblown is that employees have not much
valued the supposed advantages of ESOPs. 85 In fact, despite re-
peated exhortations and efforts to promote employee share owner-
ship, stock bonus plans were relatively unimportant until ERISA
created tax subsidies to encourage employers to impose the ESOP
version upon employees.
A pair of major drawbacks help explain why employee stock
ownership plans do not succeed without subsidy. First, a well
known incentive problem exists when a firm (particularly a large
firm) has workers as residual claimants. When non-employee
180 ERISA § 407(d)(6), 29 USCS § 1107(d)(6); IRC § 4975(e)(7), 26 USCS § 4975(e)(7);
see generally D. Bret Carlson, ESOP and Universal Capitalism, 31 Tax L Rev 289 (1976).
181 Employee Stock Ownership Plans: An Employer Handbook, Committee Print 96-25,
96th Cong, 2d Sess 23 (1980) (prepared by the staff of the Committee on Finance, US
Senate).
182 See the critique by D. Bret Carlson, ESOP and Universal Capitalism, 31 Tax L Rev
289, 289-93 (1976).
183 For a discussion of why the claimed benefits of ESOPs are illusory, see Richard L.
Doernberg & Jonathan R. Macey, ESOPs and Economic Distortion, 23 Harv J Leg 103
(1986).
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shareholders are the residual claimants, they (and the managers
representing their interest) tend to choose investment projects that
maximize the value of the firm.8 4 When, however, employees are
the residual claimants, they behave differently. Consider the situa-
tion in which the firm must decide whether to invest in a new labor
saving technology that will reduce the cost of production. Share-
holders will find it in their interest to implement the new technol-
ogy but employees who might lose their jobs as a result might op-
pose the investment. Thus, the shareholder owned firm would
adopt the efficient course of action while the employee owned firm
might not. Because employee ownership tends to be inefficient,
firms are rarely organized in this manner in the absence of subsidy
or regulatory intervention.'
A second major drawback to an employee owned firm is that
employees are inefficient risk bearers. The employee already has
much of his wealth-his human capital-tied up in the firm where
he works. If the employee is as risk averse as most of us, he should
invest the remainder of his wealth away from the employing firm,
in order to minimize risk. Investing further in the firm where he
works needlessly magnifies the intrinsic underdiversification of the
employment relationship. Shareholders, by contrast, are much
more efficient risk bearers, because by buying into or assembling a
diversified portfolio of securities, the shareholder can virtually
eliminate the firm-specific risk.
ERISA imposes a duty to diversify on pension fiduciaries,' 86
but suspends it for ESOPs. Thus, to the extent that ERISA and
the tax code promote ESOPs, the law is creating incentives for
firms to pressure employees to bear excessive and uncompensated
risk."
The severe conflicts of interest that frequently arise when the
ESOP trustees are representatives of management further high-
light the tension between ESOPs and the exclusive benefit rule. In
leveraged buy-outs involving ESOPs, for example, the ESOP trust-
ees must decide how much the ESOP should pay for employer
stock. Since the trustees typically represent (or are themselves)
"I See Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen, Organizational Forms and Investment
Decisions, 14 J Fin Econ 101 (1985) for a discussion of this point.
I85 The economics of labor owned firms is analyzed in Michael C. Jensen and William
H. Meckling, Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-managed Firms
and Codetermination, 52 J Bus 469 (1979).
186 ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C), 29 USCS § 1104(a)(1)(C).
's See Richard Brealey and Stewart Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance, ch 7-8
(McGraw-Hill, 2d ed 1984), noting that diversifiable risk is uncompensated.
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selling shareholders, the conflict of interest is intense.188
ESOPs, in short, are impossible to reconcile with the exclusive
benefit rule. The tax subsidy associated with ESOPs may be valu-
able to the firm, but is in no way targeted to employees. Moreover,
ESOPs create inefficient incentives, force workers to bear unneces-
sary risk, and subject them to the perils of self-dealing
transactions.
X. TOWARD A SENSIBLE INTERPRETATION OF THE ExCLUSIVE
BENEFIT RULE
To say that somebody is a fiduciary, Justice Frankfurter
pointed out long before there was an ERISA, "only begins analysis;
it gives direction to further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary?
What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary?" 18 9 The problem of
defining the appropriate scope of fiduciary duties is particularly
acute in ERISA. Despite the exclusive benefit rule, there is nothing
exclusive about employees' interests in pension and welfare benefit
plans. These plans are complex multiparty arrangements, and it
was unwise for ERISA to attempt to capture the complex responsi-
bilities of plan fiduciaries by analogy to the simpler world of the
private gratuitous trust.
In an employee benefit plan, depending upon the type and
condition of the plan, the fiduciary may owe duties not only to the
"participants and their beneficiaries," as ERISA's exclusive benefit
rule mandates,190 but also to the employing firm and its sharehold-
ers, to the revenue authorities, and to the federal pension insurer,
the PBGC. Moreover, as we have been at such pains to point out,
within the class of participants that ERISA's exclusive benefit rule
does identify, there are frequent conflicts of interest, especially be-
tween older and younger employees and between retirees and ac-
tive employees.
In this section, we focus on the two recurrent problems that
we have addressed throughout: (1) the employer as beneficiary;
and (2) conflicts among employees. We demonstrate that the exclu-
sive benefit rule, properly interpreted, should permit a trustee, and
ultimately a reviewing court, to recognize these realities of the
modern pension trust.
188 ERISA § 406, 29 USCS § 1106, ordinarily prohibits transactions between pension
plans and other interested parties such as large stockholders, but ERISA § 407(d)(3)(A)(ii),
29 USCS § 1107(d)(3)(A)(ii), allows these deals for ESOPs.
189 SEC v Chenery Corp., 318 US 80, 85-86 (1943).
190 ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 USCS § 1104(a)(1).
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A. The Employer as Beneficiary
The purpose of ERISA is to protect retirement security for
employees. This statutory purpose, coupled with the language of
the exclusive benefit rule that focuses solely on employees' inter-
ests, appears to preclude recognition of the employer as a benefi-
ciary. As a result, courts have been forced to indulge in pretense,
such as the notion that benefits to employers are merely "inciden-
tal," in order to reconcile ERISA with the economic realities of the
multiparty pension plan.
We believe that ERISA permits the courts to be more forth-
right in recognizing the employer's interest as beneficiary. ERISA
empowers the employer or other sponsor to create, amend, and ter-
minate plans, to name the fiduciaries, and to recapture excess as-
sets. These statutory powers evince that pension and benefit plans
embody the interests of employers as well as employees. Moreover,
it is a mistake to view a pension plan as a zero sum game, in which
an action that benefits the employer automatically harms the em-
ployees. On the contrary, from the ex ante perspective, the inter-
ests of employer and employees converge. 191 The correct interpre-
tation of fiduciary duties is the rule that maximizes the joint
welfare of both.
For the same reason, the exclusive benefit rule should not be
interpreted to mean that the trustee should decide all controver-
sies between employees and the employer in favor of the employ-
ees. Such a rule would benefit particular complaining employees ex
post, but it would operate to the detriment of employees as a class
ex ante. A rule favoring employees that overrides the initial under-
standing between the parties, whether explicit or implicit, will ac-
tually harm employees by discouraging plan formation.
We do not mean to suggest that the employer's interests will
always be compatible with those of employees. Once the initial
agreement is concluded, either party may have an incentive to be-
have opportunistically. When the trustee is a representative of the
employer, opportunistic behavior by the employer is of particular
concern. We have discussed why the decision to deny plan benefits
following severance of the employment relationship with a class of
employees has an overtone of opportunistic behavior by the
employer.'92
Frequently it will be difficult to tell whether a given action is
I" See text at notes 76-78.
192 See text at note 98.
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consistent with the ex ante understanding between the parties or
represents ex post opportunistic behavior by the employer. Our
discussion of the trustee's decision in Morse v Stanley to deny
benefits to the employees who quit their jobs and joined a competi-
tor illustrates this problem. Recognition of the importance of the
ex ante perspective will not automatically transform ERISA fiduci-
ary law from a hard field to an easy one. Often, the issues in pen-
sion and welfare benefit plans will remain complex. But hard
problems are much more likely to be solved properly when the gov-
erning rule takes account of the relevant interests.
B. Conflicts Among Employees
The language of the exclusive benefit rule speaks in the plural.
It stipulates that a duty of loyalty is owed to "participants and
their beneficiaries." It does not assume, as it could not logically
assume, that all participants and their beneficiaries will always
have the same interests. We have discussed how takeover and so-
cial investing cases frequently involve conflicts between different
classes of employees.
The problem in these situations is different from cases in
which the employer may be acting opportunistically. Because the
conflict is between classes of employees, not between the employer
and employees, opportunistic behavior by the employer is not the
issue. Nevertheless, some mechanism must exist for resolving con-
flicts among employees, even when the statute overlooks the
problem.
Conventional trust law recognizes the problem of conflicts
among beneficiaries, such as the tension between successive benefi-
ciaries (life tenant and remainderman), by means of the duty of
impartiality.193 The duty of loyalty abides in the sense that self
dealing is equally forbidden when there is one beneficiary or many.
But the duty of loyalty is owed to all the beneficiaries. Thus, the
law of trusts recognizes that the concept of "exclusive benefit"
makes no sense when the interests of some beneficiaries conflict
with the interests of others. In ERISA, by contrast, there is no ex-
press analogue to the duty of impartiality. The statute speaks of
the exclusive benefit of the employees.
Nevertheless, the duty of impartiality inheres in the logic of
M' "When there are two or more beneficiaries of a trust, the trustee is under a duty to
deal impartially with them." Restatement § 183 (cited in note 17); see also id, § 232 (impar-
tiality between successive beneficiaries).
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pension trusts. The duty should be spelled out, ideally as a matter
of legislative amendment, but more practically-in the course of
fiduciary administration and litigation-as an implied component
of ERISA fiduciary law. Recognizing an implied duty of impartial-
ity would not entail a major extension of current law. Consider
Winpisinger v Aurora Corp.,9 in which the issue was which group
of employees should be affected by a permitted cancellation of past
service credits undertaken for the purpose of protecting the fund.
The plan trustees decided to cancel the past service credit of one
group of employees but not another. The court, however, con-
cluded that this action was discriminatory and held that the fiduci-
ary duty of the trustees required that the trustees exercise discre-
tion in dealing with different classes of employees in a non-
discriminatory way. 195
The logic of Winpisinger has broad applicability. The funda-
mental principle of the case-that trustees cannot act to benefit
one group of beneficiaries at the expense of another-is essentially
the duty of impartiality that requires the multiplicity of interests
to be kept in constant consideration. The same principle could be
applied profitably to takeover and social investing situations
which, as we have discussed, so frequently involve conflicts among
beneficiaries.
Recognition of a duty of impartiality, like recognition of the
employer's interest, will not turn hard cases into easy ones. It will,
however, promote conceptual clarity by insisting that, when pen-
sion and benefit plan administration does entail conflicts of inter-
est among employees, the conflicting interests should be admitted
and evaluated rather than ignored.
19 456 F Supp 559 (N D Ohio 1978).
101 Id at 569. The court expressly relied on antidiscriminatory language that was in-
cluded in the plan agreement to qualify for tax benefits. See the discussion of the antidis-
crimination norm in text at notes 64-65. While the antidiscrimination norm is troublesome
when used to interfere with the employee's choice in joining in a plan, it could sensibly be
interpreted as a statutory duty of impartiality.
1160
